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Although very many mathematicians (and nonmathematicians) have heard of 
Giidel’s theorem, very few could explain exactly what the theorem says, let alone how 
it is proved. Yet the result is so important, and the reasons for the fundamental 
incompleteness (i.e., the impossibility of ever attaining a situation in which every true 
statement can be proved) are so simple, that Giidel’s theorem can be taught to 
first-year college students. Moreover, the only prerequisites for understanding the 
proof are familiarity with the terminology of set theory (the words “set”, “function”, 
“domain of definition” and the like) and a certain facility at understanding mathemat- 
ical arguments. Thus, the proof is even accessible to an ambitious high school student. 
The method of proving Giidel’s theorem in this book is different from Godel’s own 
method. Our method relies upon elementary concepts from the theory of algorithms. 
All of the necessary background information from this theory will be explained as 
needed, so that as a by-product of the proof the reader will become familiar with the 
basic facts of the theory of algorithms. 
This book is based on an article I wrote in the Uspekhi Matematicheskikh Nauk 29 
(1) (1974). Of course, the intended readership is quite different, so the essay had to be 
rewritten. In particular, I have omitted discussions of more specialized questions, and 
also all references to the original publications; the curious reader can find these in the 
article mentioned above. At the same time, I have expanded the section on the 
connection between the semantic and syntactic formulations of the incompleteness 
theorem, and have added appendixes on Tarski’s theorem on the inexpressibility of 
truth and on the justification of the arithmeticity axiom. 
The plan of the book is as follows. In Section 1 we state the incompleteness theorem 
and explain the precise meaning of each element in the statement of the theorem. In 
particular, the notion of a deductive system, which is central to the book, is intro- 
duced; Section 2 contains an informal exposition of some initial concepts from the 
theory of algorithms, which are then used to give our first criteria for completeness 
and incompleteness. In Section 3 we continue our study of the incompleteness criteria; 
and in Section 4 we cover the language of formal arithmetic, define exactly what it 
means for a statement in that language to be true, and give a precise statement of 
Giidel’s incompleteness theorem for formal arithmetic. Section 5 contains a develop- 
ment of the ideas concerning algorithms which were briefly described in Section 2, 
culminating in three axioms for the theory of algorithms. In Section 5 we complete the 
proof of the incompleteness theorem for formal arithmetic. 
The book concludes with seven appendices, which are written in a somewhat more 
condensed style, but still without assuming any special knowledge. In the first 
appendix we examine the connection between the existence of true statements which 
cannot be proved and the existence of statements which cannot be either proved or 
disproved. In the second appendix we prove Tarski’s theorem on the inexpressibility 
of truth, which is a strengthening of Giidel’s theorem. The third appendix is concerned 
with justifying one of the axioms of the theory of algorithms in Section 5, namely, the 
arithmeticity axiom. For this purpose we introduce a particular class of algorithms, 
the “address programs”, and we verify the arithmeticity of functions which are 
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computable by this class of algorithms. In the fourth appendix the completeness and 
incompleteness criteria in Section 2 are applied to languages connected with what are 
called “associative calculi”. The fifth appendix describes the original formulation of 
tlhe incompleteness theorem which Giidel himself gave. The sixth appendix contains 
exercises for the preceding sections. Finally, the last appendix gives answers and hints 
for these exercises. The appendices are mutually independent, and so can be read in 
any order, except that Appendix C in certain places assumes a familiarity with some 
concepts from Appendix B. 
If after reading this book the reader would like to know more about mathematical 
logic and the theory of algorithms, he or she can turn to the books listed at the end of 
the book. 
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The incompleteness theorem, for which we will give a precise statement in this 
section and later a proof, says roughly the following: under certain conditions in any 
language there exist true but unprovable statements. 
When we state the theorem this way, almost every word needs some explanation. 
Thus, we must start by explaining the meaning of these words. 
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1.1. Language 
We shall not give the most general possible definition of a language, but rather shall 
limit ourselves to those language concepts which we shall later need. There are two 
such concepts: the “alphabet of a language” and the “set of true statements in 
a language”. 
1.1.1. Alphabet 
By an alphabet we mean a finite list of elementary signs (i.e., things which cannot be 
split up into smaller units). These signs are called the letters of our alphabet. By a word 
in the alphabet we mean a finite sequence of letters. For example, the usual words in 
the English language (including proper names) are words in a 54-letter alphabet (26 
small letters, 26 capital letters, the hyphen and apostrophe). As another example the 
natural numbers written in decimal form are words in a lo-letter alphabet whose 
letters are 0, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9. We shall use ordinary capital letters to denote alpha- 
bets. If L is an alphabet, then L” denotes the set of all words in the alphabet L. We 
shall assume that any language has an alphabet such that all the expressions in the 
language (i.e., the names of various objects, statements concerning these objects, etc.) 
are words in this alphabet. For example, any sentence in English, or in fact any 
English language text, may be regarded as a word in the alphabet which is obtained by 
expanding the 54-letter alphabet to include punctuation marks, a space for use 
between words, a sign for paragraph indentation, and perhaps a few other useful signs. 
When we assume that the expressions in a language are words in some alphabet, we 
thereby rule out “multilayered” expressions, such as jabf(x) dx. However, this restric- 
tion is not very serious, because any such expression can be “stretched out” into 
a linear form using suitable notational conventions. 
Any set M which is contained in L X is called a word set in the alphabet L. If we say 
simply that M is a word set, we mean that it is a word set in some alphabet. Now the 
above assumption about a language can be rephrased as follows: in any language the 
set of expressions is a word set. 
1.1.2. The set of true statements 
We assume that we are given a subset Tof the set L” (where L is the alphabet of the 
language under consideration) which is called the set of “true statements” (or simply 
“truths”). In going right to the subset T we are omitting such intermediate steps as: 
firstly, specifying which words of all the possible ones in the alphabet L are correctly 
formed expressions in the language, i.e., have a definite meaning in our interpretation 
of the language (for example, 2 + 3, x + 3, x = y, x = 3,2 = 3, 2 = 2 are correctly formed 
expressions, while + =x is not); secondly, which of all the expressions are,formulus, 
i.e., in our interpretation make statements which may depend on a parameter (for 
example, x = 3, x = y, 2 = 3,2 = 2); thirdly, specifying which of all the possible formulas 
are closed.formulus, i.e., statements which do not depend on parameters (for example, 
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2 = 3, 2 = 2) and finally, which of all the possible closed formulas are true statements 
(for example 2 = 2). 
1.1.3. 
For our purposes it will be enough to consider that a language is completely defined 
as soon as we are told its alphabet L and the subset T of L”. We shall call any such 
(L, T) a fundamental pair. 
1.2. Unprovable 
“Unprovable” means not provable, and “provable” means having a proof. 
1.3. Proof 
Although the term “proof” is perhaps the most important in mathematics,’ it does 
not have an exact definition. The full notion of a proof, with all its ramifications, 
belongs as much to the realm of psychology as to mathematics. After all, a proof is 
simply an argument which we find so convincing that we are ready to use it to 
convince others. 
1.3.1. 
When written down, a proof becomes a word in some alphabet P, just as English 
language texts are words in an alphabet L, as mentioned above. All proofs comprise 
a subset (a rather wide-ranging subset, to be sure) of P”. We shall not attempt to give 
a precise definition for this “naive” and “absolute” concept of proof, or, equivalently, 
for the corresponding subset of P”. Instead, we shall study a formal analog of this 
notion of proof, for which we shall still use the term “proof”. This analog has two 
essential features which are different from the intuitive notion (although the intuitive 
idea of a proof reflects these features to some degree). In the first place, we shall allow 
different concepts of proof, i.e., different proof-subsets of P”, and, in fact, we shall also 
allow the alphabet P to vary. In the second place, for each such concept of proof we 
shall require that there be an effective method, or algorithm (a precise definition of this 
term will be given in Section 2), which verifies whether or not a given word in the 
alphabet P is a proof. We shall also assume that there is an algorithm which, given 
a proof, determines what statement it proves. (In many situations, the statement being 
proved is simply the last statement in the sequence of steps which make up the proof.) 
1.3.2. 
Thus, our final definition is as follows: 
(1) We have an alphabet L (the language alphabet) and an alphabet P (the proof 
alphabet). 
1 Bourbaki begins his Foundations ofMathematics with the words, “ From the time of the Greeks, to say 
‘mathematics’ has meant the same as to say ‘proof’“. 
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(2) In the set P” we are given a subset P, whose elements are called proofs. We 
further assume that we have an algorithm which, given an arbitrary word in the 
alphabet P, enables us to determine whether or not it belongs to P. 
(3) We have a function 6 (to determine what is being proved) whose domain of 
definition A satisfies P c A c P” and whose range of values is in L”. We assume that 
we have an algorithm which computes this function (the precise meaning of the words 
“an algorithm computes a function” will be explained in Section 2). We shall say that 
an element p of P is a proof of the word 6(p) in the language alphabet L. 
1.3.3. 
A triple (P, P, S) which satisfies conditions (l)-(3) is called a deductive system over 
the alphabet L. 
1.3.4. 
For the benefit of the reader who is familiar with the usual way of characterizing 
a “proof” in terms of “axioms” and “rules of deduction”, we now explain how this 
method can be regarded as a special case of the definition in Section 1.3.2. That is, 
a proof is usually defined to be a sequence of expressions in a language such that each 
term either is an axiom or else is obtained from the earlier terms using one of the rules 
of deduction. If we add a new letter * to our language alphabet, we can write out such 
a proof as a word in the resulting alphabet: a sequence of expressions ( C1 , C2, . , C,) 
becomes the word C1 * CZ * . *C,. The function which determines what is being 
proved simply takes from such a word the part that follows the last *. The algorithms 
required by the definition in Section 1.3.2 can easily be constructed once we specify 
any of the customary meanings of “axiom” and “rules of deduction”. 
1.4. Attempts at a precise formulation of the incompleteness theorem 
1.4.1. First attempt 
“Under certain conditions, given a fundamental pair (L, T) and a deductive system 
(P, P, S) over L, there always exists a word in T which does not have a proof”. This 
statement is still too vague. In particular, we could obviously think up many deductive 
systems having very few provable words. For example, there are no provable words at 
all in the empty deductive system (where P = 8). 
1.4.2. Second attempt 
There is another more natural approach. Suppose we are given a language, in the 
precise meaning that we are given a fundamental pair (L, T). We now look for 
a deductive system over L (intuitively, we look for techniques of proof) in which we 
can prove as many words in T as possible, ideally, all words in T. Giidel’s theorem 
describes a situation in which such a deductive system (in which every word of T has 
a proof) does not exist. Thus, we would like to make the following statement: “Under 
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certain conditions concerning the fundamental pair (L, T) there does not exist 
a deductive system over L in which every word in T has a proof”. However, this 
statement is clearly false, since one need only take the deductive system with P = L, 
P=P” and 6(p)=p for all p in P”; then every word in L” is trivially provable. Thus, 
we need a restriction on the deductive systems that we are allowed to use. 
1.5. Consistency 
It is natural to require that only “true statements”, i.e., words in T, can be proved. 
We say that a deductive system (P, P, S) is consistent relative to (or for) the funda- 
mental pair (L, T) if we have 6(P) E T. In what follows, we shall only be interested in 
consistent deductive systems. If we have a language, it is very tempting to try to find 
a consistent deductive system in which every true statement is provable. The version 
of Godel’s theorem which we shall study states precisely that, under certain conditions 
concerning the fundamental pair, it is impossible to find such a deductive system. 
I .6. Completeness 
We say that a deductive system (P, P,6) is complete relative to (or for) the 
fundamental pair (L, T) if we have 8(P) 2 T. Our statement of the incompleteness 
theorem now takes the following form: 
Under certain conditions concerning the fundamental pair (L, T), there does not exist 
any deductive system over L which is both complete and consistent relative to (L, T). 
For now, we shall be satisfied with this formulation. In latter sections we shall 
specify the conditions which the fundamental pair must satisfy. 
2. Basic concepts from the theory of algorithms and their application 
Conditions for the nonexistence of a complete and consistent deductive system can 
easily be given in terms of the theory of algorithms. 
For now, we shall only need the most general intuitive idea of what an algorithm is: 
a set of instructions which, given an input (also called the initial data or the argument) 
from some set of possible inputs (for the given algorithm), enables us to obtain an 
output if such an output exists or else obtain nothing at all if there is no output for our 
particular input. Note that the set of possible inputs consists of all inputs to which the 
algorithm can be applied, not only those for which the algorithm gives an output. If 
there is an output for a particular input, then we say that the algorithm can be applied 
to this input and processes it to give the corresponding output. 
For our purposes, in order to avoid unnecessary digressions, we shall suppose that 
the inputs and outputs of an algorithm are words. More precisely: every algorithm has 
an input alphabet, so that all possible inputs are words in this alphabet, and an output 
alphabet, so that all outputs are words in this output alphabet. This means, for 
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example, that in order to work with algorithms which process pairs or sequences of 
words, we must first write such pairs or sequences as single words in a new alphabet. 
To be definite, whenever we have an alphabet L we shall agree to let a star stand for 
a new letter not in our alphabet L (thus, the star denotes different letters in different 
situations). We shall let L, denote the alphabet obtained by adding the star symbol to 
our original alphabet L. In Section 1.3.4 we already agreed to write a sequence of 
words ( C1, . , C,) in the alphabet L as the single word Ci * . * C, in the alphabet 
L,. For example, a pair (C, , C,) will be written as the C1 * C2 in the alphabet L,. 
Furthermore, suppose that for fixed n we have a set of n alphabets Li, L, ,. . ., L,. We 
then let * denote a letter that is not in any of the alphabets Li, and we write a sequence 
(Ci , . . . , C,) in which each Ci is a word in the corresponding alphabet Li, as the single 
word Ci * . . . * C, in the alphabet (L, uL, u ... uL,),. We shall let L’r x . . . x L,” 
denote the set of all such sequences of n words in the respective alphabets, or 
equivalently, the set of corresponding single words formed using the star symbol. 
The set of all inputs that can be processed by a given algorithm is called the domain 
of applicability of the algorithm. Any algorithm defines a function, namely, the 
function which associates the corresponding output to every element in the domain of 
applicability. Thus, the domain of definition of this function is precisely the domain of 
applicability of the algorithm. We say that the algorithm computes the function that is 
defined in this way. 
We shall let A(.u) denote the output obtained by applying the algorithm A to the 
input x, and for brevity we write A ( (.x1, x2, , x,)) simply as A (x, , x2,. , x,). Then 
the definition of the term “computes” can be rephrased as follows: the algorithm 
A computes the functionfif we have A(x)=f’(x) for all x. Here 21 is the “conditional 
equality” sign, which is defined as follows: A ‘v B either if A and B are both undefined, 
or if A and B are both defined and are the same. 
A function which can be computed by some algorithm is called a computable 
function. Thus, in part (3) of the definition of a proof (see Section 1.3.2) we are saying 
that the function which yields the statement being proved must be a computable 
function. 
Because of our assumptions about the meaning of an algorithm, for every comput- 
able function we must have two alphabets such that all possible arguments of the 
function are words in the first alphabet and all possible values of the function are 
words in the second alphabet. 
We are especially interested in functions whose arguments and values are natural 
numbers (we shall always include zero in the natural numbers). Such functions are 
called numerical functions. In order to be able to speak of computable numerical 
functions, we must introduce algorithms which deal with numbers, and to do this we 
must first of all represent the natural numbers as words in some alphabet, called 
a digital alphabet. There are various ways of doing this, for example: (1) the binary 
system, in which numbers are written in the alphabet {0, 1); (2) the decimal system, 
which uses the alphabet {O, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9}; (3) the system using a one-letter 
alphabet ( 1 ) with the number n written as the word 11 I (repeated n times); (4) the 
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system in which n is written as the word (11 .. . 1) (where 1 is repeated n times) in the 
three-letter alphabet { 1, (,)}; an d so on. We simply choose the most convenient system 
for our particular purposes. Each symbol for a number (in some fixed system) is 
called a digit. When we speak of algorithms and computable functions which 
process numbers, strictly speaking we shall mean algorithms and computable func- 
tions which process the digits used to write these numbers (in some chosen notational 
system). 
Thus, the notion of a computable numerical function seems to depend upon our 
choice of notational system for writing numbers. However, it is easy to show that 
a numerical function which is computable in one notational system will be comput- 
able in any other, at least for a large class of notational systems. We shall say that two 
notational systems are equivalent if there exists an algorithm which processes an 
arbitrary number written in the first system and gives as output the same number 
written in the second system, and also an algorithm which processes a number 
written in the second system and gives as output the same number written in the first 
system. The examples of notational systems given above are obviously mutually 
equivalent. 
We now show that a numerical function f which is computable in one notational 
system will also be computable in any equivalent notational system. Let C and D be 
algorithms which translate from the first notational system to the second and 
conversely, and let A be an algorithm which computes the function fin the first 
notational system. (More precisely, the algorithm A computes the function of digits in 
the first notational system which corresponds to,f, which is a function of numbers.) 
Then the following algorithm B will computefin the second notational system (more 
precisely, B will compute the function of digits in the second notational system which 
corresponds to f): 
B(x)=CAD(x). 
That is, the set of instructions for the algorithm B can be described as follows: 
“Translate the input x (a number written in the second notational system) into the first 
notational system, they apply the algorithm A, and then translate the output (if 
A gives an output) into the second notational system”. In a similar way, the notion of 
an enumerable set of numbers, which will be defined below, can be shown to be 
independent of our choice of notational system for writing numbers. 
Because of this, once we have a digital system, we shall not be pedantic about 
distinguishing between numbers and the digits which represent them. For example, we 
shall use the letter N to denote both the set of natural numbers and the set of digital 
representations of natural numbers. 
A set is said to be enumerable if either it is the empty set or it is the set of elements in 
some computable sequence (i.e., the set of values of some computable function which 
is defined on the natural numbers). We say that the function (or sequence) enumerates 
our set. Obviously, every enumerable set is a word set. 
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Example 1. The set N* consisting of all pairs of natural numbers is enumerable. One 
possible choice of enumerating function is the function 
q(n)=(a,b), where n=2”(2b+l)-1. 
Example 2. For any alphabet L, the set L” of all words in the alphabet is enumerable. 
One possible way to construct an enumerating sequence is as follows. First order the 
elements of L in an arbitrary way. Then list the words in L in the following order: with 
words of different lengths, the shorter one comes first, and with words of the same 
length we use alphabetical (also called lexicographical) order (i.e., when comparing 
two words, we find the first place, moving from left to right, where the letters are 
different, and then take the two words in the order in which those two different letters 
occur in our ordering of the alphabet L). By listing the words in this order, we obtain 
the required enumerating sequence. 
In this second example, one might ask how we know that the sequence of words is 
enumerable, i.e., how can we obtain an algorithm which, given k, produces the kth 
term uk of the sequence? Here is one possible algorithm: write out the first k+ 1 
elements of the sequence (i.e., aO, a,, . . . ,uk), and then take the last word that was 
listed. 
Example 3. The computable function f which enumerates L” and which was con- 
structed in Example 2 gives us a one-to-one correspondence from N to L”. Hence, we 
have a well-defined inverse function f ‘, which gives a one-to-one correspondence 
from L” to N. Thisf ’ is also computable, for example, by the following algorithm: 
to compute f - l(u), successively write out f(O), f( l), ,f(2), . . . until you reach an II for 
whichf(n)=u; this n is thenf-‘(a). 
Example 4. If we have any two alphabets L1 and L,, the composition of the 
computable function mapping N onto LT in Example 2 with the computable function 
mapping L? onto N in Example 3 gives us a computable function which is a one- 
to-one correspondence between Ly and LT. 
A subset S of a set A is said to be decidable relative to A if there exists an algorithm 
which determines whether or not an element of A belongs to S. That is, the algorithm 
processes all the elements of S to a single output x (for example, x is the word “yes”) 
and processes all the elements of the complement A\S to a second output word y (for 
example, “no”; of course, it makes no difference which words x and y we choose). 
Obviously, a subset S is decidable relative to A if and only if the set A\S is decidable 
relative to A. In part (2) of the definition of a proof (see Section 1.3.2) we required that 
the set of all proofs be a decidable subset of the set of all words in the proof alphabet. 
From the definition of decidability it follows that the domain of applicability of the 
algorithm in the definition must include all of A. It makes no difference whatsoever 
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what happens if the algorithm is applied to words not in A. For example, if we want to 
construct an algorithm which distinguishes between the poetry of Pushkin and the 
poetry of Lermontov (two famous Russian poets), in other words, if we want to prove 
that the set of poems of Pushkin is decidable relative to the set consisting of all the 
poems of Pushkin and Lermontov, then we do not at all care what output is obtained 
(or if nothing is obtained) when we apply our algorithm to the poetry of the Soviet 
poet Mayakovsky or to the instructions for installing a washing machine. 
One might ask the natural question: what happens if we use a more restrictive 
definition of decidability, and require that the algorithm in the definition be applicable 
only to elements of the set A? With this narrower definition, a subset S is decidable 
relative to A if and only if the characteristic function of S relative to A (i.e., the function 
defined on A which takes the value 1 on S and 0 on A\S) is computable. As we shall 
see in Section 5 (Corollary 1 of the protocol axiom), the domain of applicability of an 
algorithm is always an enumerable set. Hence, only enumerable sets could have 
decidable subsets in the sense of this new, narrower definition of decidability. How- 
ever, if our set A is enumerable, then both definitions of decidable subsets are 
equivalent. Suppose, for example, that f is a computable function which enumerates 
A, and B is an algorithm which decides the subset S relative to A in the sense of our 
first definition. Then the following algorithm will also decide S relative to A while at 
the same time having A as its domain of applicability: take an arbitrary a, successively 
write out f(O),f(l),f(2), . . . , and, as soon as you obtainf(n)=a apply the algorithm 
B to a. 
Remark 1. Since any computable function, enumerable set, or decidable subset is 
given by some algorithm, we can use purely quantitative considerations to see that 
there must exist functions which are not computable, sets which are not enumerable, 
and subsets which are not decidable. (Here we always mean word sets, functions 
having word sets as their domain of definition, and so on.) Namely, any algorithm can, 
if we want, ultimately be written in the English language (perhaps with some 
mathematical symbols added), i.e. according to Section 1.1.1, it can be written as 
a word in some rather large alphabet, and in any alphabet the set of all words is 
a countable set. And the set of all numerical functions (or sets) is uncountable. Of 
course, while this argument proves the existence of nonalgorithmic objects, it is of no 
use in constructing individual examples of such sets and functions. 
We are now ready to use these concepts from the theory of algorithms to study the 
question of whether a complete and consistent deductive system can exist. 
Lemma 1. For any word set X, the sets $!J and X are decidable relative to X. 
Proof. Let X be a word set in the alphabet L. It is enough to take the algorithm which 
gives the same output x for any input word in L”. This algorithm decides the set 8 and 
also the set X relative to X. 0 
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Theorem 1. If T is an enumerable set, then one can find a complete and consistent 
deductive system for the fundamental pair (L, T>. 
Proof. We have to give the triple (P, P, 6). Recall that 8 and P” are decidable relative 
to P”, by Lemma 1. If T=@, then we take the triple (P,@,6), where P and 6 are 
arbitrary. If T#@, then T= {r(O),t(l),t(2), . . ,}, w h ere r is a computable function; we 
then identify n with the word 11 . . 1 of length n and set P = ( / }, P = P”, 6 = T. tl 
Remark 2. This proof is not really as artificial as it might appear at first glance. In 
fact, if the set of truths in some language is enumerable, i.e., forms an enumerable 
sequence, then, in order to see that an expression belongs to this set (i.e., in order to 
prove that the expression is true) it suffices to give the number of the expression in the 
sequence (this number can thus be considered to constitute the proof). 
The converse of Theorem 1 will be proved later (Theorem 3). First we shall need to 
prove some auxiliary lemmas. 
Lemma 2 (Enumerability of a decidable subset). A decidable subset qf an enumerable 
set is enumerable. 
Proof. Suppose that S G A, and A is enumerated by the computable functionf: If S is 
the empty set, then S is enumerable, be definition. If S is nonempty, then there exists an 
s such that SES. We set 
if .f(nkS 
if ,~(~)EA\S. 
Clearly, y is a computable function which enumerates the set S. 0 
From Lemma 2 it follows that any decidable subset of the set of natural numbers is 
enumerable. However, the converse is false: in Section 5 we shall construct an example 
of an enumerable but nondecidable subset of the set of natural numbers. The next 
lemma gives a condition for an enumerable set to be decidable. 
Lemma 3. A subset S qfan enumerable set X is decidable relative to X [f and only if both 
S and its complement X\S are enumerable. 
Proof. If S is decidable, then so is X\S, and so both S and X\S are enumerable, by 
Lemma 2. Conversely, suppose that both S and X\S are enumerable. If either one is 
empty, then S is decidable, by Lemma 1. Suppose that both S and X \S are nonempty, 
in which case they are enumerated by some computable functionsf’and g, respectively. 
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Then, if we want to answer the question “Does x belong to S?” for an arbitrary x in X, 
we need only compute successively 
f(O), s(O), f(l)> g(l), f(2)> g(2), ... 
until we encounter x. Note that x must eventually occur, since the above sequence 
exhausts all of X. If x occurs among the values off, then x belongs to S; if x occurs 
among the values of g, then x does not belong to S. 0 
Theorem 2. The set of all proofs (.for a gitlen deductive system) is enumerable. 
Proof. The set of all words in the proof alphabet is enumerable (see Example 2). 
Hence, the theorem follows from Lemma 2. 0 
Lemma 4 (The image of an enumerable set). Suppose that R is an enumerable set and 
f is a computable function which is defined on all elements of R. Then f(R) is an 
enumerable set. 
Proof. If R is empty, then so is f (R). If R is enumerated by the computable function p, 
then f (R) is enumerated by the computable function y =f (p(x)). 0 
Example 5. Let 1 be a symbol in some alphabet L, and let A G L”. We let 1 A 
denote the set of all words of the form 1 a, where aEA. If we set R = A and f(a) =l u 
in Lemma 4, we see that enumerability of A implies enumerability of 1 A; and if we set 
R =l A and f (1 a)=a, we see that, conversely, enumerability of 1 A implies enu- 
merability of A. 
Example 6. We claim that L” x L” is enumerable for any alphabet L. In fact, the sets 
FU2 and L” are both enumerable (see Examples 1 and 2). Let L” be enumerated by the 
computable sequence g. We define a computable functionfon the set N2 by setting 
f(a,b)=(g(a), g(b)). Obviously, f(kJ’)=L” x L” and then our claim follows from 
Lemma 4. 
As usual, we let K1xK2x...xK, denote the direct product of the sets 
KI,K2, . . . . K,, i.e., the set of all n-tuples (k,,k,, . . . . k,) such that k,EK,, 
k,EK,, . . . ,k,EK,. In view of our notational convention at the beginning of the 
section, if L1, . , L, are alphabets and K 1 c L;“, , K, G LR, then the product 
K, x ‘.. xK,isasetofwordsinLrx...xL:. 
Corollary 1 of Lemma 4. If K 1, . . . , K, are enumerable sets, then so is the product 
K1 x . . . x K,. 
Proof. When n = 2, the proof follows the argument in Example 6. Then we proceed by 
induction, and apply Lemma 4 to the “obvious” computable function from 
(K,x~~~xK,)xK,+, to KIx...xK,xK,+l. 0 
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The r-tuple (Ci,) . . . , Ci,), where ii <n, . . , i,bn, is called the projection of the 
n-tuple (C,, . . . , C,) onto the i I, . . . , i, axes, and is denoted pril ,,__, i, (Ci, . . . , C,). 
In particular, we have prl (C,, . . . , C,,)=Ci, pr2(C1, . . ,Cn)=C2, etc. If 
M!GK,x... x K,, then we let pril ,...,i,h4 denote the set of all possible projections 
pri, ,,__, i,m, where mcM. 
Corollary 2 of Lemma 4. If L, , , L, are alphabets, il, . , i, are positive integers not 
exceeding n, and M is an enumerable subset of L;” x ... x LF, then pri, ,,, ,,i,M is 
enumerable. 
Proof. It suffices to use the computable function xHpri, ,..,,i,x. 0 
Theorem 3. The set of all provable words (for a given deductive system) is enumerable. 
Proof. Let Q be the set of all provable words for the deductive system (P,P,6). 
Obviously Q = 6 (P). However, P is an enumerable set by Theorem 2. Hence Q is also 
enumerable, by Lemma 4. 0 
It follows that if T is not an enumerable set, then it is impossible to find a complete 
and consistent deductive system for the pair (L, T), since the set Q of provable words 
for any consistent deductive system is a proper subset of T, and there will have to be 
an element in complement T \ Q. Such an element is a true but unprovable statement! 
Theorems 1 and 3 together give a condition on a fundamental pair which is 
necessary and sufficient for the existence of a complete and consistent deductive 
system for the pair. This condition is enumerability of the set of all truths. One would 
expect (and this is what turns out to be the case) that in a “rich” or “expressive” 
language the set of all truths is too complicated to be enumerable, and hence there are 
no complete and consistent deductive systems for such a language. However, the 
criterion in Theorems 1 and 3 is not very convenient to use, since it is often difficult to 
study the entire set T. In the next section we shall reformulate our criterion so as to 
make it more “applicable”. 
3. The simplest incompleteness criteria 
We now know that enumerability of the set T is equivalent to the existence of 
a complete and consistent deductive system for (L, T). 
However, we might be interested not in all truths in the language, but only in truths 
of a certain type or a certain class, much as a student studying for a math exam is not 
concerned with the truth of all mathematical statements, but only those which are 
likely to be encountered on the exam. For example, we might want to construct 
a deductive system in which one can derive all true statements of length at most 1000 
and cannot derive any false statement of length at most 1000. In this case, for 
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a statement of length greater than 1000 the question of whether or not it can be 
derived in the deductive system may have nothing to do with whether or not it is true. 
Moreover, in certain situations (such as the language of set theory), one cannot even 
define the set of all truths in their totality. This is why we restrict ourselves to 
considering consistency and completeness for subsets of the word set L”. We now 
proceed to the formal definitions. 
Let (L, T) be a fundamental pair, let (P, P, S) be a deductive system over L, and let 
Q be the set of all provable words. Suppose that I/C_ L”. We say that the deductive 
system (P, P, S). 
(a) is consistent relative to V if VnQ E V/n T: 
(b) is complete relative to V if Vn T G VnQ. 
Theorem 4. Suppose that V is an enumerable subset of L”, and the set oftrue statements 
in V is not enumerable. Then there is no deductive system which is both consistent and 
complete relative to V. 
Proof. By assumption, VA T is not enumerable. In order for a deductive system to be 
complete and consistent relative to V, we must have VA T= V/n Q. However, VnQ 
must be enumerable, because of Theorem 3 and the following lemma. 0 
Lemma 5. The set-theoretic union or intersection of two enumerable sets is enumerable. 
Proof. Suppose that R and S are enumerable sets. We first prove that R US is 
enumerable. This is trivial if one of the two sets is empty. If both sets are nonempty, 
then we have R = {p(O), p(l), . . . } and S = {a(O), g(l), . . >, where p and c are comput- 
able sequences. Then we can enumerate RuS by means of the computable sequence 
fdefined as follows:f(2n) = p(n), f(2n + 1) = a(n). We now prove that R n S is enumer- 
able. If RnS is empty, then it is enumerable, by definition. Otherwise there exists an 
a such that aeRnS. Again suppose that R and S are enumerated by the computable 
functions p and C. Since the set NZ is enumerable (see Example 1 in Section 2), it is 
enumerated by some computable function g. Each value of g(n) is a pair of natural 
numbers: let us denote the two numbers in this pair by t(n) and n(n). The functions 
5 and q are obviously computable. We introduce a function h by setting 
h(n) = 
,45(n)) if d5:(n))=Mn)), 
a otherwise. 
The function h is computable, and it enumerates the set R n S. q 
Remark 1. The condition in Theorem 4 is actually necessary as well as sufficient for 
there not to exist a deductive system, which is complete and consistent relative to V. 
(The necessity of this condition is even true without assuming that V is enumerable.) 
Namely, if Vn Tis enumerable, then the complete and consistent deductive system for 
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(L, Vn T) which exists by Theorem 1, will also be a complete and consistent 
deductive system for (L, T) relative to Z’. 
Clearly, a deductive system is consistent (or complete) for (L, T) if and only if it is 
consistent (respectively, complete) relative to every subset of L”. Hence, if we have 
a consistent deductive system for (L, T) and want to show that this deductive system 
is incomplete for (L, T), then we need only find a subset V of L’” relative to which our 
deductive system is incomplete. We now give a construction which enables us to find 
such a subset V in many important cases. 
We shall say that membership in a set of natural numbers S is expressible by means 
of the fundamental pair (L, T) if there exists a computable function f’ (expressing 
membership in S) which is defined on the natural numbers, takes values in L” and has 
the properties: 
(1) if YES, then fit 
(2) if ngFU\S, then,f(n)EL’” \T. 
The set V consisting of all values of such a functionfis an enumerable set. Hence (by 
Theorem 4) if we know that the set Vn T of true statements in V is not enumerable, 
we can conclude that there does not exist a deductive system which is complete and 
consistent relative to V. Also, as we shall now see, Vn T is a nonenumerable set if the 
set S is not enumerable. 
Lemma 6 (On the full preimage of an enumerable set). Letf‘ he a computablejiinction 
whose domain of dejinition is an enumerable set.2 Let B be un arbitrary enumeruble set. 
Then the set .f ’ l(B) is enumerable. 
Proof. Iff’-‘(B) is empty, then it is enumerable, by definition. Now suppose that 
c~f ~’ (B), and the set B is enumerated by the computable function h. Suppose that 
the domain of definition off is enumerated by the computable function y. In order to 
enumerate the set ,f - l(B) we proceed as follows. 
We run through the set fV x RY and for each pair (m, k) we check whether or not 
ftakes g(m) (the nzth element listed in the domain of definition off) to h(k) (the kth 
element listed in the set B). If it does, then we include g(m) in our list of the elements of 
f’-‘(B), and if it does not, then we simply list the element c. 
More precisely, let < and r] be defined as in the proof of Lemma 5. We set 
if ,fMir(n)))=W4), 
otherwise. 
It is easy to see that cp is a computable function which enumerates the setf‘ - ’ (B). 0 
We now return to the line of thought we left to prove Lemma 6. Note that 
S =.f’ - ’ ( V n T). Thus, if S is not enumerable, then neither is Vn T (since, by Lemma 6, 
* Actually, the domain of definition of any computable function is enumerable: however, the proof of this 
fact requires some further study of algorithms, which we shall postpone until Section 5. 
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if V/n T were enumerable, then its full inverse image S would also be enumerable). In 
view of Theorem 4, we have thereby proved: 
Theorem 5. If there is a single nonenumerable set of natural numbers in which member- 
ship is expressible by means of the fundamental pair (L, T), then there cannot exist 
a complete and consistent deductive system for (L, T). Moreover, there cannot exist 
a deductive system which is both consistent and complete relative to the set of values of 
the function which expresses membership in our nonenumerable set. 
Remark 2. The sufficient condition in Theorem 5 is also a necessary condition for 
there not to exist a deductive system with the indicated properties. In fact, if there is no 
complete and consistent deductive system for (L, T), then T is nonenumerable (by 
Theorem 1). Meanwhile, L n, is enumerable (see Example 2 in Section 2) and so is 
enumerated by some computable functionf: Since T=f (f -l(T)), it follows that the 
set f-‘(T) is not enumerable (by Theorem 3). However, the function f expresses 
membership in f -’ (T) by means of the pair (L, T). 
4. The language of arithmetic 
In this section we apply the constructions of the earlier sections to the language of 
arithmetic. Intuitively speaking, the language of arithmetic is the language whose 
statements are given in terms of natural numbers and the addition and multiplication 
operations (using logical operations and the equal sign). In order to give a formal 
definition, we must construct a suitable fundamental pair. Of course, there are many 
possible ways to construct such a pair. For example, various different alphabets can be 
used. We shall choose a 14-letter alphabet A (our “arithmetic alphabet”) consisting of 
the following symbols: 
(1) and (2) the parentheses ( and ), 
(3) the symbol 1 for forming numbers; 
(4) the symbol x for forming variables; 
(5) and (6) the addition sign + and multiplication sign .; 
(7) the equals sign =; 
(8)-(14) the logical symbols 1, A, V, +, H, 3, V (the intuitive meanings of these 
symbols are as follows: “it is false that”, “and”, “or”, “if . . . , then”, “if and only if”, 
“there exists . such that”, “for all”). 
In order to specify a suitable set of true statements, we must look at some questions 
involving syntax. That is, we must identify certain classes of words in A” and study 
their structure. 
We shall let CC’ denote the word c(. . .c( (repeated n times), where cx is a letter. If n = 0, 
then the word CP is empty (contains no letters). By a number we mean a word of the 
form (I “), where n > 0, and by a variable we mean a word of the form (x”), where n > 0. 
In our intuitive interpretation of the language, the word (I”) is a way of writing the 
256 VA. Uspensky 
number II, and the word (x”) is one of an infinite sequence of variables (we might need 
an arbitrarily large number of these variables to write a statement in arithmetic). We 
now give the following inductive definition of a term: 
(1) all numbers and all variables are terms: 
(2) if t and u are terms, then (t + U) and (t . u) are terms. 
Any variable which occurs in a term will be called a parameter of the term. A term 
which has no parameters is called a constant. 
Example 1. The term (( III). (1 I)) 1s a constant. The terms (O.(x)) and ((11 l)+(xx)) are 
not constants: (x) is a parameter in the first of these terms and (xx) is a parameter in 
the second. 
To any constant term we can associate a number, called its o&e, according to the 
following rules: 
(1) the value of (I”) is the number n, 
(2) the value of a constant term of the form (t+u) is the sum of the values of the 
constant terms t and U, and the value of the constant term (t.n) is the product of the 
values of the constant terms t and u. 
Example 2. The constant term (( / ( I) + (( I ). (I I))) has value 5. 
A word of the form (t = u), where t and u are terms, will be called an elementary 
formula. We then give an inductive definition of a formula, as follows: 
(1) any elementary formula is a formula; 
(2) if M is a formula, then 1 c( is a formula; 
(3) if c( and fl are formulas, then (M A /?), (a V B), (cc+/_?) and (M-P) are formulas: 
(4) if c1 is a formula and 5 is a variable, then 35~ and V&I are formulas. 
Example 3. The word 
is a formula. 
For ease of reading, we shall abbreviate terms and formulas, writing n in place of (I”) 
and x, in place of (x”), and omitting outer parentheses. For example, the formula in 
Example 3 can be written in abbreviated form as follows: 
The true statements in our language will be defined as a subset of the set of all 
formulas. However, first we need to introduce the notions of a formula’s parameters 
and the substitution of numbers in place of variables. 
To every formula we associate a certain finite set of variables; these variables will be 
called the parameters of the formula. The set of parameters of a formula is defined 
inductively according to the following rules: 
Gijdel’s incompleteness theorem 257 
(1) the set of parameters of an elementary formula (t=u) consists of all of the 
parameters of the term t together with all of the parameters of the term U; 
(2) the formula 1 a has the same parameters as the formula 2; 
(3) the set of parameters of the formula (IX A fi), (a V fi), (LX + fi) or (cr++p) consists of 
all of the parameters of the formula c( together with all of the parameters of the 
formula /I; 
(4) the set of parameters of the formula 35~ or V<a consists of all of the parameters 
of the formula tx except for r. 
Example 4. The only parameter of the formula in Example 3 is xi. In fact, the formula 
(xi =x2) has parameters x1 and x2, as does the formula 1 (xi =x2), the formula 
Vx21 (x1 =x2) has only one parameter xi, and the formula 3x, Vx27 (xi =x2) has 
no parameters. Meanwhile, the formula Vx2 (xi =x2) has one parameter xi. 
More intuitively, the parameters are simply the variables which occur freely in the 
formula, i.e., which are not in the range of quantifiers 3 and V. 
Formulas having no parameters are called closedformulas. The formula in Example 
3 is not a closed formula. Closed formulas can be interpreted as statements about the 
set of natural numbers. A closed formula is said to be “true” or ‘false” in accordance 
with the rules described below (which agree with the intuitive meaning of the symbols 
in the formula). The closed formulas which are given the value “true” will form our set 
of “true statements of the language of arithmetic”. 
Example 5. The sentence “for every natural number except zero there exists a smaller 
natural number” can be translated into the following closed formula of arithmetic: 
Note that, because our language does not have the symbol <, we had to write “x2 is 
less than x1 ” in a roundabout way, namely: 
3x~(l(xj=o)A((x~+xj)=x~)). 
Before describing how to determine the value of a closed formula, we need to 
introduce one final technical definition. We now define the result of substituting the 
number n in place of the variable w in the formula LX. This result is a formula which is 
denoted S,Wa and is defined inductively according to the following rules: 
(1) the result of substituting n in place of w in an elementary formula (t = u) is simply 
the result of replacing all occurrences of the variable w by the number n: 
(2) S,"-lcr=1S,Wa: 
(3) if /J is any of the symbols A, V, +, or t+, then 
S;(a~_g)=(s~ans~g); 
(4) if Q is one of the symbols V or 3 and if < is a variable, then the result of 
substituting n in place of w in the formula Qgcl is the formula Q[S;cr, provided that 
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the variable w is different from the variable t; otherwise (if w and < are the same 
variable) the result of the substitution is simply the original formula Qgc(. 
Example 6. If c( is the formula in Example 3, then S;‘r is ~x~VX-~~ (x1 = 
xz)-Vxz(5 =.x2), and Sl’cc is ‘u. Note that if we replaced all occurrences of x1 in c( by 
5, then we would obtain the word 35 Vxzl (5=x2)-+Vxz(5=xz), which is not 
a formula. Thus, an important feature of our definition is that the occurrences of 
~1 which fall in the scope of 3~1 or V’w are left unchanged when a number if substituted 
in place of w. 
Lemma 7. The set of purameters of the formula S,“cc consists of ull the parameters of 
c( which are d@erent from w. 
Proof. This rather obvious fact can be proved by induction on the number of steps in 
the construction of CI (or by induction on the length of the word a). 0 
We are now ready to proceed to the determination of the value of a closed formula. 
As mentioned above, there are two possible values: “true” (T) and “false” (F). A closed 
formula having the value T will be called a “true statement”, and a closed formula 
having the value F will be called a “false statement”. We assign values to closed 
formulas using induction on the number of steps in the construction of the formula, as 
follows: 
(1) the closed formula (t = u) is true if the values of the constant terms t and u are 
equal; otherwise it is false; 
(2) the formula 1c1 is true if c( is a false statement; otherwise it is false; 
(3) the formula (c! A p) is true if both 3 and B are true statements, otherwise it is 
false; 
(4) the closed formula (a V jzl) is true if at least one of M or /J is true, otherwise (z V /I) 
is false; 
(5) the formula (a+p) is false if N is a true statement and p is a false statement, 
otherwise (a+p) is true; 
(6) the formula (R-/I) is true if c( and /I are closed formulas with the same truth 
value, otherwise (a-P) is false; 
(7) the closed formula 3ts( is true if there exists a number n such that Sza is a true 
statement; if no such number exists, then 3<c( is false; 
(8) the closed formula Via is true if Siz is true for all n; otherwise V<c( is false. 
In connection with (7) and (8) we note that S,$U is a closed formula, since the formula 
a has no parameters other than < (otherwise 3<r and Vtx would not be closed 
formulas). 
Example 7. The formula in Example 5 is true. The formula in Example 3 is neither 
true nor false, since it is not a closed formula. However, the result of substitution of 
any number in place of x1 in the formula in Example 3 is true statement. 
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Thus, it is the true closed formulas which we have chosen to be the true statements 
of arithmetic. If we let Tdenote the set of true statements, we arrive at the fundamental 
pair (A, T) for the language of arithmetic. The question that interests us is whether 
there exists a complete and consistent deductive system for this pair. We shall use the 
criterion in the last section to show that no such deductive system exists. 
To do this, we must show that there exists a nonenumerable set of natural numbers 
such that membership in this set is expressible by means of our fundamental pair 
(A, T). For this purpose we shall introduce a certain class of sets such that member- 
ship in any set in this class if expressible by means of (A, T). We shall then look for 
a nonenumerable set in this particular class. The class of sets we are speaking of is the 
class of so-called “arithmetic sets”. It is defined as follows. 
Let c( be a formula having no parameters except perhaps the variable xi. Then S,Xl a 
is a closed statement, true or false, for any n. We consider the set of such and only such 
numbers n for which Si’r is a true statement. We shall say that this set is associated 
with the formula c(. Any set of numbers which is associated with some formula in A will 
be called a Giidel-arithmetic set, or, for brevity, simply an arithmetic set. 
Arithmetic sets have several obvious properties: 
Property 1. The complement of an arithmetic set is an arithmetic set. Namely, if M is 
associated with the formula c(, then (N\M) is associated with the formula 1%. 
Property 2. The union or intersection of two arithmetic sets is an arithmetic set. 
Namely, if M1 and M2 are associated with c(r and Mu, respectively, then M1 n M2 is 
associated with (zr A c(~), and Ml u M2 is associated with (c(r V x2). 
Property 3. Membership in any arithmetic set is expressible by means of (A, T). 
Namely, suppose that the arithmetic set M is associated with the formula c(. We define 
the functionfas follows: the value offat y1 is the word S,X’CC. Thenfis a computable 
function which expresses membership in M. 
The key step in our proof of Godel’s theorem is the following claim: 
(*) there exists a nonenumerable arithmetic set. 
We shall postpone the proof of this claim until the next section. Once the claim has 
been proved, we can then conclude, because of Property 3 and Theorem 5, that: 
there does not exist a complete and consistent deductive system for the fundamental 
pair (A, T) qf the language of arithmetic. 
This result is Godel’s incompleteness theorem for formal arithmetic, it says that, 
given any carefully defined notion of proof, there exists either a provable but false 
statement in the language of arithmetic or else a true but unprovable statement in the 
language of arithmetic. 
Remark 1. Suppose that M is a nonenumerable arithmetic set. According to the 
second part of Theorem 5, iff is any computable function expressing membership in 
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M and V is its set of values, then there does not exist a deductive system which is 
both complete and consistent relative to V. Thus, if we have a consistent deduct- 
ive system, we must be able to find true but unprovable statements by looking 
no farther than the sequence f(O), f( l), f(2), . . We just saw that we can for f take 
the function nHS,X’tl, where M is associated with CL If we choose f in this way, it 
is natural to interpret the word j”(n) as the statement that “nEM”. Hence, speak- 
ing informally, we see that a true but unprovable statement can be found (for 
any consistent deductive system!) among the statements of the form “n,M”. In 
the next section we shall see that the set M can be chosen in such a way that 
its complement E = N \M is enumerable. Thus, there exists an enumerable set E 
such that for any consistent deductive system there is a true statement of the form 
“n does not belong to E” which is unprovable. (Note that, by Theorem 1, it 
would be impossible to have “n belongs to E” in place of “n does not belong to E” 
here.) 
Remark 2. Several of the definitions in this section use induction on the number of 
steps in the construction of the terms and formulas. Here a possible difficulty arises. 
Suppose, for example, that a word X had the form (c( A p) and simultaneously had the 
form (c(‘+fi’), where a,fi, a’, p’ are formulas. In this case the requirements of the 
sections of the inductive definition relating to formulas of the form (R A fl) and to 
formulas of the form (a’-+P’) might contradict one another. 
For this reason, when we give inductive definitions we must be sure that the terms 
and formulas can be analyzed in a unique way, i.e., the different cases in the definition 
of a term and in the definition of a formula are mutually exclusive. When in our 
definitions a term or formula is obtained as a result of combining two terms or 
formulas, the terms or formulas which are being combined must be uniquely deter- 
mined. This is the purpose for which the parentheses are used in formulas. If we want 
a formal proof that terms and formulas can be analyzed in a unique way, the following 
fact will be useful: 
the number of left parentheses in a term or formula is equal to the number of right 
parentheses; and ifthe word X comes at the beginning of a term or,formula and is not the 
whole term or formula, then the number of left parentheses in X is greater than the 
number of right parentheses. 
It is amusing to note that the role parentheses play in preventing ambiguities in our 
formal language is analogous to the role of punctuation in the natural language 
of everyday speech. For example, where one places the comma in the sentence 
“Execute we cannot show mercy. 1” has a crucial effect on the meaning; the decision 
about where to put the comma amounts to a choice between “Execute A we cannot 
show mercy!” and “Execute we cannot A show mercy!” By the way, it is possible to 
find sentences in natural language with ambiguities that cannot be cleared up by 
punctuation. 
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5. Three axioms for the theory of algorithms 
5.0. 
Our goal now is to prove the claim (*) in the last section. However, the rather diffuse 
ideas about algorithms with which we have been satisfied in the earlier sections are 
not sufficient to prove this claim. 
The traditional method of continuing our argument would be to refine the idea of 
an algorithm i.e., replace the somewhat indefinite concept of algorithm which we have 
been using, which has the advantage of being completely general, by a more precise 
and restricted notion, i.e., by a “special type of algorithm”. By the way, it should be 
mentioned that this narrower notion of an algorithm would have a claim to being 
equivalent to our original definition, in the sense that the class of computable 
functions which arises from one definition is the same as the class of computable 
functions arising from another (and, therefore, the class of enumerable sets is the same 
for each definition). This claim that the classes of computable functions (or enumer- 
able sets) are the same does not have the status of a theorem that can be proved, it is 
rather a conjecture that can be verified in practice. We can then construct a precise 
mathematical theory of functions which are computable by the “special type of 
algorithm” (here the proof of facts analogous to those in Problems 9 and 10 for 
Appendix C turns out to be technically the most difficult part of this theory). The 
unprovable belief that the class of functions computable by the “special type of 
algorithm” coincides with the class of all computable functions is important only for 
the purpose of justifying the meaningfulness of the theory. For more details on one 
such traditional approach, see Appendix C. 
However, here we shall choose another method. Without committing ourselves to 
a special type of algorithm, we shall instead impose some restrictions on our original 
conception of an algorithm. These restrictions will be stated in the form of three 
axioms: the protocol axiom, the program axiom, and the arithmeticity axiom. 
5.1. The first axiom 
We consider the process of applying an arbitrary algorithm A to the input x to 
obtain the output y. We shall assume that all of the intermediate computations, the 
entire computing process leading from x to y (where the word “computation” is meant 
in the broadest possible sense, by no means including just numerical calculation) can 
be written down in a record in such a way that this “protocol” contains exhaustive 
information about the successive stages of the computing process. 
Example 1. When checking a computer program it is often necessary to print out not 
only the final result but also all of the intermediate results. The resulting “computer 
protocol” is a word in the output alphabet of the computer, perhaps with the addition 
of a sign for a blank, a sign for a new line, etc. 
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Example 2. Suppose we want to check whether children learning how to add a col- 
umn of figures have correctly understood the addition algorithm. We might require 
that in their written work, in addition to the final result, they also write down all of 
their steps in some agreed upon notational system. One might use a notational system 
for the computations in which, for example, the protocol for adding 68 and 9967 
would be 
1 11 111 1111 1111 
68,9967 68 68 68 68 68 68 10035 
9967 9967 9967 9967 9967 9967 
5 35 035 0035 10035 
Each term in the protocol is either a decimal number (in our example 10035) or else 
a pair of numbers (in our example 68, 9967), or else a four-storey structure such as 
11 
68 
9967 
35 
(the “basement” and “attic” may be empty). It is not hard to make the protocol into 
a word in some alphabet. Namely, one need only introduce some additional symbols 
so that, for example, the above four-storey structure can be written first as a table 
and then as a word: (**11*/***68/*9967/ ***35). The entire protocol is written as 
follows: 
(68+9967)(*****/***68/*9967/*****)(***1*/***68/ 
*9967/****5)(**11*/***68/*9967/***35)(*111*/***68/ 
~9967/**035)(1111*/***68/*9967/*0035)(1111*/***68/ 
*9967/10035)(10035). 
In this notational system the protocol for adding any two numbers is a word in the 
15-letter alphabet {O, 1,2,3,4,5,6,7,8,9, (,), /, +, * ). 
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These examples suggest the following general considerations. We shall suppose 
that: 
(1) for each algorithm A there is an alphabet IT, (the protocol alphabet), and all 
protocols describing the operation of A for the various inputs in the algorithm’s 
domain of applicability together form a subset PO of the set Ilg; 
(2) there exist computable functions r and w such that, for each protocol pO in PO, 
the values CI ( pO) and w ( pO) are, respectively, the input x and the output y for which the 
protocol pO was written (i.e., pO is a protocol for the processing of x into y); 
(3) PO is decidable relative to l7;. 
We restate this more briefly in the form of an axiom, which we shall call the protocol 
axiom: 
for each algorithm A there exist an alphabet IT,, a decidable subset PO of the set Il;, 
a computable function cz, and a computable function CO, such that: 
A(x) = y if and only if there exists pO in PO for which g( pO) = x and o( pO) = y. 
This axiom has the following corollary. 
Corollary 1. The domain of applicability and the set of outputs of an algorithm are 
enumerable sets. 
Proof. The first of these sets is cc(P,,), and the second is w(P,). Both of these sets are 
enumerable in view of Lemmas 2 and 4 and Example 2 in Section 2. 0 
Corollary 2. The domain of definition and the set of values of any computable function 
are enumerable sets. 
Proof. This follows immediately from Corollary 1. q 
Corollary 3. The graph of any computable function (i.e., the set of all pairs (x,y) for 
which f (x) = y) is an enumerable set. 
Proof. We apply the protocol axiom to the algorithm which computes f and find the 
corresponding set PO and functions a and o. We then construct a computable function 
$ by setting It/(p) = (~1 (p), o(p)). Finally, we note that the graph off is precisely the set 
$(P,), so it remains to apply Lemma 4. 0 
Remark 1. We could have obtained Corollary 2 as a consequence of Corollary 3. 
Namely, we could apply Corollary 2 of Lemma 4 and note that domain of definition 
and the set of values of a function are, respectively, prr M and pr2 M, where M is the 
graph of the function. 
Remark 2. Enumerability of the graph of a function is not only a necessary condition 
(as we established in Corollary 3) but also sufficient condition for the function to be 
computable. In fact, if the graph is the empty set, then the function is nowhere defined 
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and so is computable. If the graph of the functionfis nonempty and is enumerated by 
the computable function tj, then one can use the following algorithm to computef: to 
compute the value f(a), go through the pairs $(O), t/1(1), $(2), . . . until you obtain 
a pair whose first term is a; thenf(a) is the second term in this pair. 
5.2. The second axiom. 
Functions whose arguments lie in X and whose values lie in Y are customarily 
called functions from X to Y. Similarly, an algorithm whose possible inputs lie in 
X and whose outputs lie in Y will be called an algorithm from X to Y. Here we may 
take X= K” and Y= L” where K and L are alphabets. An algorithm from K” to L” 
is a set of instructions, i.e., a text in English or some other language (perhaps an 
artificial language created especially for writing algorithms). Although in concrete 
situations there is usually no problem in deciding whether or not a given text is an 
algorithm, nevertheless the notion of a set of instructions is too vague to enable us 
unambiguously to distinguish between a text which is a set of instructions and a text 
which is not a set of instructions. We do not have a single sufficiently precise way of 
understanding what a set of instructions means. The instructions could be written in 
any of many languages, and even within a single langauge the problem of interpreting 
the meaning of a text is rather complicated. 
Nevertheless, we shall assume (this will be the program axiom) that it is possible to 
identify with full certainty a set consisting of all sets of instructions according to 
a single uniform interpretation of what that means. This class of sets of instructions 
will be representative in a sense that will be made more precise below. The sets of 
instructions in this representative class will be called programs. 
We shall say that two algorithms are equivalent if they have the same domain of 
applicability and if they give the same output when they process any input in the 
domain of applicability. A set of algorithms from K” to L” will be said to be 
representative (for the alphabets K and L) if any algorithm from K” to L” is 
equivalent to some algorithm in our set. When we said before that we want to be able 
to identify this set with “full certainty”, we meant that we want it to be a decidable 
subset of the set of all words in some alphabet. When we say that we should have 
a “single uniform interpretation” of what a program is, we mean that there should be 
an algorithm U which is applicable to pairs (program p, input a) and which gives as 
output the result of applying the program p to the input a. (Here a denotes an input for 
p; (p,u) is an input for U.) 
Remark 3. It is not hard to show that any of the traditional approaches using 
a “special type of algorithm” can be reduced to the above scheme. Any such refine- 
ment of the notion of algorithm essentially amounts to a particular choice of a set 
PI of programs and an algorithm U which explains how to apply the program to 
initial data; it is then claimed (as an unprovable stipulation) that the set PI is 
representative. 
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Thus, we shall assume that: 
(1) for any two alphabets K and L there is an alphabet n, (the program alphabet) 
and a set P, of algorithms which are called programs and are written in the alphabet 
Z7, (i.e., Pi E Z7r); 
(2) there exists an algorithm CT from II? x K” to L” (the algorithm for applying 
a program) such that U(p, a) is the result of applying p to a; 
(3) the set PI is representative; 
(4) the set PI is decidable relative to Ii’?. 
Here we are by no means assuming that the alphabet ZZ,, the set PI and the 
algorithm U can be chosen only in one way. Any triple (II,, PI, lJ>, where n, is an 
alphabet, PI is the set of all programs written in this alphabet, and U is an algorithm 
describing how a program processes input, will be called a programming method from 
K” to L”. Thus, for fixed K and L there may be various possible programming 
methods. 
Remark 4. Our assumptions (l)-(4) do not fully define what a “programming 
method” means. That concept in its entirety will remain something for us to under- 
stand on an intuitive level. The above assumptions merely give some properties of this 
concept (and not all the properties, as a deeper analysis will show), properties which 
we are assuming are satisfied by some triple. 
We now proceed to state the second axiom. However, first we need some notation. 
Suppose that G is an arbitrary algorithm from Ii’? x K” to L m. If pEI77,“, then we let 
G, denote the following algorithm from K” to L”: for any a in K”, take the output 
from applying G, to a to be the result of applying G to the pair (p, a); in other words, 
G,(u) =G(p, a). Using this notation, we can restate our assumptions (l)-(4) as the 
following program axiom: 
for any two alphabets K and L there exist an alphabet l7,, a decidable subset PI of the 
set Xl?, and an algorithm Ufrom I77 x K” to L”, with the following properties: for 
every algorithm A from K” to L” there is a p in PI such that the algorithms A and U,, are 
equivalent. 
This axiom also has some important corollaries. However, first we give a few 
definitions. 
Suppose that I, X and Y are sets, and F is a function from I x X to Y. If i is an 
element of I, then we let Fi denote the function from X to Y which is defined on x for 
which the pair (i,x) is in the domain of definition of F and which takes the value 
F(i, x) at such an x. Using the conditional equality sign, we can abbreviate this 
definition as follows: 
F;(x)-F(i,x). 
Now suppose that @ is some class of functions from X to Y. We shall say that 
a function F from I x X to Y is universal for the class @ if the following two conditions 
hold: 
(1) the function Fi belongs to the class @ for every iEZ; 
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(2) each function in @ is Fi for some i; in other words, for every cp~@ there exists ill 
such that q(x)--F(i, x) for all XEX. 
Corollary 1 (of the program axiom). Suppose that K and L are IWO alphabets, and @ is 
the family of all computable functions from K” to L”. Then there exists a computable 
function from N x K” to L” which is universal from the class @. 
Proof. Condition (1) automatically holds for any computable function F (since if F is 
computable, then so are all of the Fi). So we need only construct a computable 
function F from N x K” to L” which satisfies condition (2). We consider the alphabet 
HI, the decidable subset PI of the set III?, and the algorithm Ufrom IIT x K” to L”, 
the existence of which is ensured by the program axiom. Since P, is a decidable subset 
of an enumerable set, it is enumerable, by Lemma 2; let f be a function which 
enumerates PI. Then we claim that the function F defined by the relation 
F(i,x)= U(f (i),x) 
has the desired property. 
To see this, let cp be any computable function from K” to L”, and let A be an 
algorithm which computes cp, i.e., .4(x)=9(x) for all XEK~. By the program axiom, 
there exists a p in PI such that the following conditional equality holds for all XEK~: 
U( p, x) N A (x). 
Since PEP,, we have p =f(i) for some i; then for this i we have the chain of conditional 
equalities: 
F(i,x)- U(,f(i),x)= U(p,x)=A(x)-q(x), 
which shows that our function F satisfies condition 2 in the definition of a universal 
function. 0 
As a special case of Corollary 1 we have the following corollary. 
Corollary 2. There exists a computable function F from N x N to N which is universal 
for the class of all computuble functions from N to N. 
Proof. We obtain Corollary 2 from Corollary 1 if we take both K and L to be one of 
the digital alphabets for writing numbers, for example, the alphabet [ I}. 0 
We shall say that two functions f and g from X to Y are everywhere different if there 
is no x in X for which the conditional equalityf(x)-g(x) holds. This means that for 
every x at least one of the functions f or g is defined at x, and, if both functions are 
defined at x, then they have different values there. 
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Corollary 3 (From Corollary 2). There exists a computablefunction dfrom N suck that 
no computable function from N to N can be everywhere diflerent from d. 
Proof. Let F be the universal function in Corollary 2. We take d to be the function 
defined by the relation: 
d(i)= F(i, i). 
Then d(i) ‘v F,(i), so that d and Fi cannot be everywhere different. However, since any 
computable function from N to N is FL for some i, this means that no computable 
function from RJ to N can be everywhere different from d. 0 
This corollary might at first seem paradoxical, since it would seem that, for 
example, the function d 1 (x) 2: d(x) + 1 is everywhere different from d. The explanation 
for this apparent paradox is that d is a function which is not defined everywhere, so 
that at values of x for which d (and hence d,) is undefined we have the conditional 
equality d, (x)=d(x). However, what if, instead of dI, we considered a function 
D1 which extends dI and is everywhere defined (this means that D, is a function which 
is everywhere defined and which coincides with dI wherever d, is defined)? Now this 
D1 is everywhere different from d: if d(x) is defined, then d,(x) is also defined and is 
equal to d(x) + 1, in which case D,(x) = d(x) + 1 *d(x); while if d(x) is not defined, then 
we also have D,(x) + d(x), because the left-hand side is defined and the right-hand 
side is not. Have we found a contradiction to Corollary 3? No, there is no contradic- 
tion here, we have merely proved that an everywhere defined extension of the function 
d, cannot be computable. This gives us the following corollary. 
Corollary 4 (From Corollary 3). There exists a computable function from N to N which 
does not have a computable extension dejined on all of N. 
Suppose that q is a computable function as in Corollary 4, i.e., it does not have 
a computable extension to N. Could the domain of definition of q be a decidable 
subset of N? It is easy to see that the answer is no. Namely, if the domain of definition 
were a decidable subset of N, then the function Q defined by setting 
q(x) 
Q(X)= o 
i 
if x is in the domain of definition of q, 
if x is not in the domain of definition of q, 
would be a computable everywhere defined extension of q. Thus, the domain of 
definition of q is a nondecidable set. According to Corollary 2 of the protocol axiom, 
this set is enumerable. We have thereby proved 
Corollary 5 (From Corollary 4). There exists an enumerable nondecidable subset of the 
set of natural numbers. 
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The fact that such a subset of N exists is one of the most important facts to come out 
of the theory of algorithms. 
Since a subset of the natural numbers is decidable if and only if both it and its 
complement are enumerable (by Lemma 3), the preceding corollary can be restated as 
follows: 
Corollary 6 (From Corollary 5). There exists an enumerable subset ofthe set ofnatural 
numbers whose complement is not enumerable. 
5.3. The third axiom 
If one ignores the (rather important) fact that computers can only work with 
functions defined on finite sets of natural numbers (since extremely large values of the 
argument simply will not fit in the computer), we may suppose that the functions 
which computers can compute are the computable numerical functions as defined 
above. It is well known that the basic operations which a computer can perform are 
addition, multiplication, and the logical operations. Experience working with com- 
puters leads one to the conviction that any computable function can be programmed 
using these operations. Consequently, one is led to believe that any enumerable set of 
natural numbers (since it is the set of values of a computable function) can be 
described in terms of addition, multiplication, and the logical operations. These 
considerations (for more details, see Appendix C) motivate the introduction of the 
following urithmeticity axiom: 
every enumerable set of natural numbers is arithmetic. 
Finally, the claim in the last section, which it was our goal to prove, is now an 
immediate consequence of this axiom: 
there exists an arithmetic set which is not enumerable. 
Namely, the complement of the set in Corollary 6 above is such an arithmetic set: it is 
a nonenumerable set with enumerable complement. Note that this set will be arithme- 
tic because its complement is arithmetic (the first property of arithmetic sets). 
We have thereby finished the proof of the incompleteness theorem. As we noted 
before, the existence of a nonenumerable arithmetic set implies the existence of 
a nonenumerable set such that membership in the set is expressible in arithmetic. This 
implies that there does not exist a deductive system for (A, T) which is complete and 
consistent relative to a certain enumerable subset V. Consequently, no consistent 
deductive system can be complete for (A, T). 
Appendix A. The syntactic and semantic formulations of the incompleteness theorem 
A.1. Statement of the problem 
It is natural to call the version of Gddel’s incompleteness theorem that we proved 
a “semantic” formulation, since it says something about the truth of statements of 
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arithmetic. In general, the word “semantic” refers to the part of the study of a language 
(in our case the language of arithmetic) which is concerned with the meaning of 
expressions and their truth or falsity. This part of linguistic study is to be distinguished 
from syntax which investigates expressions in the language as combinations of 
symbols apart from their meaning. (Sometimes the word “syntactic” is used in 
a narrower sense, referring to the part of grammar which studies how words are 
combined in sentences of a natural language.) We would like to proceed to a syntactic 
formulation of the incompleteness theorem, i.e., our present purpose is to remove to 
whatever extent possible every reference to the truth of statements. 
A completely satisfactory execution of this task would require us to make the 
notion of a proof much more concrete. This would take us beyond the scope of this 
short book. Nevertheless, in this appendix we shall take a few steps in this direction. 
A.2. Syntactic consistency and syntactic completeness 
Suppose that (P, P, S) is a deductive system over the alphabet A of the language of 
arithmetic. (For the remainder of this appendix we shall only be concerned with 
deductive systems over A.) We shall say that the deductive system is syntactically 
consistent if there does not exist a closed formula CY for which both z and 1~1 are 
provable in the deductive system. We shall say that the deductive system is syntacti- 
cally complete if at least one of the closed formulas CY or 1 CI is provable in the 
deductive system for any closed formula CL 
These definitions can be stated more briefly if one first defines the notion of a closed 
formula which is refutable in the deductive system: this is a closed formula c( such that 
lc( is provable in the deductive system. We can now restate the above definitions as 
follows: a deductive system is syntactically consistent if there is no closed formula 
which is both provable and refutable in it, and the system is syntactically complete if 
every closed formula is either provable or refutable. 
The lemma that follows gives the connection between these notions and our earlier 
notions of a deductive system which is consistent or complete for (A, T). We recall 
that a deductive system is said to be consistent if all provable closed formulas are true, 
and it is said to be complete if all true closed formulas are provable. 
Lemma A.l. (A) A consistent deductive system is syntactically consistent. 
(B) A complete deductive system is syntactically complete. 
(C) If a deductive system is consistent, then it is complete if and only if it is 
syntactically complete. 
Proof. (A) If CI and lc( were both provable in a consistent deductive system, then 
x and lee would both be true, and this contradicts the definition of truth. (B) One of 
the closed formulas tl or 1 CI must be true, and hence must be provable if the deductive 
system is complete. (C) Suppose that the deductive system is consistent and syntacti- 
cally complete. To show that it is complete, let c( be a true closed formula. Then 1 c( is 
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false, and so 1 (x cannot be provable (because the system is consistent). Then, since the 
system is syntactically complete, c( must be provable. Cl 
Because of the lemma, it is natural to propose the following syntactic version of the 
incompleteness theorem: 
there does not exist u syntactically consistent and syntactically complete deductive 
system jbr the languuge of urithmetic. 
This version has the advantage that, in the first place, it implies the semantic version 
of the incompleteness theorem we proved above, and, in the second place, there is 
nothing in it which refers to the truth of a statement. However, this statement as it 
stands is false. For example, a deductive system in which a closed formula is provable 
if and only if the symbol 1 occurs an even number of times (such a deductive system 
exists, by Theorem 1) is syntactically consistent and syntactically complete. 
Upon reflection, we arrive at the conclusion that this failure is due to the absence in 
the above formulation of any connection with the usual meaning of the symbols of the 
alphabet A. In our example of a syntactically consistent and syntactically complete 
deductive system, both the formula (2.2)=4 and the formula (2.2)= 5 are provable. 
We can extricate ourselves from this situation if we impose the requirement on the 
deductive system that certain closed formulas must be provable in it. We now make 
this more precise. 
Suppose that DO and D are deductive systems. We shall say that D is an extension of 
DO if every closed formula which is provable in DO is also provable in D. (In this case, 
obviously every closed formula which is refutable in D, is also refutable in D.) We shall 
say that a deductive system DO is completuhle if it has a completion, i.e., an extension 
which is a syntactically consistent and syntactically complete deductive system. The 
example above shows that the empty deductive system (in which no statement is 
provable) is completable. 
Using the concept of completability, we can propose another syntactic version of 
Giidel’s incompleteness theorem: 
there exits an uncompletahle deductive sq~stem. 
However, this version is meaningless since any syntactically inconsistent deductive 
system is uncompletable. Besides, we want the syntactic version of the incompleteness 
theorem to imply the semantic version proved above. This requirement will be 
satisfied if we choose the following version: 
there exists nrz uncompletable consistent deductive system. 
(This assertion implies, by the way, that there cannot exist a complete and consistent 
deductive system, since such a deductive system would be a completion of any 
consistent system.) It is this syntactic version which we shall study. 
However, before proving this syntactic incompleteness theorem, we first explain 
why it is better than our original (semantic) version of the theorem. After all, it refers 
to the property of consistency, which is defined using the notion of truth. The crucial 
point is that it is possible to give an uncompletable consistent deductive system 
explicitly, and for this explicitly described deductive system the uncompletability 
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property does not involve the concept of truth. (Of course, in our eyes the value of this 
property comes from our belief in the consistency of the deductive system.) 
We now proceed to the proof of the above statement. We shall need some new 
concepts from the theory of algorithms. 
A.3. Inseparable sets 
Suppose that K is an alphabet and A and B are disjoint subsets of K”. We shall say 
that the set C separates A from B if A c C and B A C = 8. If the set C separates A from 
B, then its complement (in K”) separates B from A. We shall say that A and B are 
separable if there exists a decidable subset C of the set K” which separates A from B. 
(In this case the complement of C is a decidable subset of K” which separates B 
from A.) 
Lemma A.2. Two disjoint sets A and B are separable ifund only ifthe,function from K” 
to N which is deJined by setting 
if XEA, 
if XGB, 
undefined if x4 A v B 
has an everywhere defined computable extension. 
Proof. If g is an extension off which is computable and is defined everywhere, then 
the decidable set {x 1 g(x) = 1) separates A from B. Conversely, if C is a decidable set 
which separates A from B, then the computable function g which equals 1 on elements 
of C and 0 elsewhere is an extension off: Cl 
Lemma A.3. There exist inseparable enumerable subsets of N. 
Proof. According to the preceding lemma, it suffices to show that there exists a com- 
putable function h from N to N which takes on only the two values 0 and 1 and which 
does not have an everywhere defined computable extension. In that case the sets 
{x 1 h(x) = l} and {.x1 h(x) = 0} will be enumerable (by Lemma 6 and Corollary 1 of the 
protocol axiom) and inseparable. In order to construct a function h with the desired 
properties, we refer to the proof of Corollary 4 of the program axiom in Section 5 and 
consider the function d which has the property that no computable function can be 
everywhere different from it. We define the function h as follows: 
1 if d(x)=O, 
h(x)= 0 
i 
if d(x) is defined and nonzero, 
undefined if d(x) is undefined. 
Any everywhere defined extension of h would be everywhere different from d; hence it 
could not be computable. 0 
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We now state a criterion for a deductive system to be uncompletable which uses the 
notion of inseparability. 
Theorem A.l. If the set of provable closed formulas and the set of refutable closed 
formulas in a given deductive system are inseparable, then this deductive system is 
uncompletable. 
Proof. If the deductive system had a completion, then the set of provable closed 
formulas and the set of refutable closed formulas in the completion would be disjoint 
enumerable sets which together exhaust the set of all closed formulas. By Lemma 3, 
each of these two sets - in particular, the set S of provable closed formulas - is 
a decidable subset of the set of all closed formulas, and hence a decidable subset of the 
set A”‘. The set S separates the set of closed formulas provable in our original 
deductive system from the set of closed formulas which are refutable in that system. 
However, this contradicts the hypothesis of the theorem. 0 
A.4. Construction of’ an uncompletable deductive system. 
We shall use Theorem A.1 to construct an uncompletable deductive system. Let 
P and Q be inseparable enumerable subsets of N (such sets exist by Lemma A.3). P is 
an arithmetic set, by the arithmeticity axiom (see Section 5); let P be associated with 
the formula a. Let [nEP] denote the formula S,X’x (where n is a number). The formula 
[nEP] is true if and only if ngP. For each n in P we consider the (true) formula [nEP]; 
for each n in Q we consider the (also true) formula 1 [nEP]. These formulas form an 
enumerable set. According to Theorem 1, there exists a deductive system in which 
these formulas and only these formulas are provable. This deductive system is 
consistent. We now show that it is uncompletable. According to Theorem A.l, in 
order to do this it suffices to prove that the set of provable formulas in the deductive 
system and the set of refutable formulas are inseparable. We now show this. If nEP, 
then the formula [neP] is provable; if neQ, then the formula [nEP] is refutable. Thus, 
if S were a decidable set which separated the provable formulas from the refutable 
ones, then the decidable set {nl[nEP]ES) would separate P from Q, and this is 
impossible. We have thus constructed an uncompletable deductive system. 
Appendix B. Arithmetic sets and Tarski’s theorem on the nonarithmeticity of the set of 
true formulas of the language of arithmetic 
As explained in Section 4, the closed formulas of the language of arithmetic are 
statements about properties of the set of natural numbers and the operations of 
addition and multiplication. These statements can be either true or false. However, the 
question “True or false?” has no meaning for formulas with parameters. If we replace 
the parameters in a formula by numbers, then we obtain a closed formula whose truth 
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value in general depends upon which numbers we substituted in place of the variables. 
Thus, formulas with parameters can be interpreted as properties of natural numbers. 
Example 1. The result of substituting n in place of xi in the formula 3x2((x2 +x2)= 
x1) is a true statement if and only if n is even. Thus, we could say that this formula 
expresses the property “xi is even”. It is also common to say (somewhat imprecisely) 
that this formula is true for even values of x1 and false for odd values of xi. 
Example 2. The formula 3x,((x, +x,)=x2) expresses the property “xi dx,“. 
Example 3. The formula 3x2((x1 .x2)=x3) expresses the property “x1 divides x3”. 
Example 4. Let [x1 divides x3] denote the formula in Example 3. Then the formula 
Vxl ([x1 divides xg] +((xi = 1) V (x1 =x3))) 
expresses the property “x3 is prime or equal to 1” 
Example 5. Let [x1 is even] denote the formula in Example 1. Then the formula 
Vx, ([xi divides x3] -([x1 is even] V (x1 = 1))) 
expresses the property “every divisor of x3 is either even or equal to l”, i.e., “x3 is 
a power of 2”. 
Properties which are expressible by the formulas of the language of arithmetic are 
called arithmetic properties. The subset of Nk consisting of k-tuples of natural 
numbers having a certain arithmetic property is called an arithmetic subset of Nk. The 
definition of an arithmetic subset of N that was given in Section 4 is a special case 
(k= 1) of this definition. 
We now make these definitions precise. Suppose that a is a formula in the language 
of arithmetic, wi , , . . , wp are variables, and ci, . . . ,cp are numbers. By the result of 
substituting c 1, . , cP in place of WI, . , wP in cx we mean the formula 
s;l,,,>~c(=s> . . . SW~SW’cX) C2 C, 
which is obtained from x by successively substituting c1 in place of wl, c2 in place of 
w2, . . , cp in place of wp. (It is easy to see that these substitutions can be performed in 
any order; for example, the result would have been the same if we had defined 
SWl...WBc( as S”’ C,...C&, C1 . . . Scwppc(.) 
Let a be a formula of arithmetic whose parameters are a subset of xi, . . . ,xk. We 
consider the subset of Nk consisting of k-tuples (cl, . . . , ck) for which the closed 
formula S:,l.....>Fa is true. We shall say that this set is associated with the formula CC 
A set which is associated with a formula of arithmetic will be called an arithmetic set. 
When k= 1, this gives us the earlier definition (in Section 4) of an arithmetic subset of 
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the set of natural numbers. We shall identify properties with the sets of objects having 
the property, and so shall speak of the arithmeticity of properties of natural numbers. 
Example 6. The sets {(Y~,x~)~x~=x~}, {(xl,x~,xJ)~xl+x~=x~} and {(x1,x2, 
x3) /x1 .x2 =x3} are all arithmetic, since they are associated with formulas xi =.x2, 
(x1 +x2)=x3, and (xi .x,)=x3, respectively. 
Example 7. The set ((x,,.x2)~.x1<x2) 1s associated with the formula in Example 2, 
and so is an arithmetic set. 
Example 8. The set {(x1,x2) Ix1 divides x2} is arithmetic. To construct a formula 
with which it is associated, we must slightly modify the formula in Example 3 by 
interchanging x2 and x3. 
Example 9. The set of prime numbers and the set of powers of 2 are arithmetic subsets 
of the set of natural numbers (see Examples 4 and 5). 
The properties of arithmetic subsets of N that were given in Section 4 hold more 
generally for arithmetic subsets of Nk. In particular, we have the following lemma. 
Lemma B.l. (a) The complement (in Nk) qfan arithmetic subset of Nk is arithmetic; 
(b) the union or intersection of two arithmetic subsets qf Nk is arithmetic. 
The next lemma says that arithmeticity is preserved if one permutes the coordinates. 
Lemma B.2. Let rs be a permutation of‘ the set { 1, . , k} (i.e., a one-to-one correspond- 
ence from the set to itself), und let M be an arithmetic subset of Nk. Then the set 
M6=((x1,...,xk)l(x,,,,. .-L(k))EM) 
is arithmetic. 
Proof. If the set M is associated with the formula M, then the set M” is associated with 
the formula a” which is obtained from z by replacing each variable in the list x, , . , .xk 
by the corresponding variable in the list x0(i), . . . ,x,(k). 0 
The next two lemmas give a connection between the classes of arithmetic subsets of 
Nk for different k. 
Lemma B.3. If M is an arithmetic subset qf‘ Nk, then M x N” is an arithmetic subset 
of Nk+h. 
Proof. In fact, M x Nh is associated with the same formula as M. 0 
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Lemma B.4. If A4 c N k’h is an arithmetic subset, then its projection onto the first 
k coordinates, i.e., the set 
M’= { (x1, ) x,)~3x,+, ...3Xk+h((X1,...,Xk+h)EM)) 
is an arithmetic subset of Nk. 
Proof. If M is associated with the formula 2, then M’ is associated with the formula 
j&+1 . . &++,,X. 
Combining Lemmas B.2 and B.4, we can conclude that the projection of an 
arithmetic set onto any set of axes is arithmetic. 0 
Suppose that M c N2 is an arithmetic set. For each nE N we consider the “cross- 
section” M,, which is the set of x for which (n, x)EM. Since it is a projection of the set 
({n)xN)nM,‘t’ 1 1s arithmetic. We shall say that M c N2 is a universal arithmetic set if 
any arithmetic subset of N is a cross-section of M. It turns out that there is no such set. 
Theorem B.l. A universal arithmetic set does not exist. That is, for any arithmetic set 
M c N2 there exists an arithmetic set Q c N which is difSerent from every cross-section 
of M. 
Proof. The set Q={xI(x,x)$M) . 1s arithmetic, since it is a projection of the set 
W*\M)n((x>~)lx=y}. H owever, it cannot be a cross-section of M, since if Q were 
the same as M,, then, by the definition of M,, we would have nEQ o (n, n)EM; but 
nEQ*(n,n)$M, by the definition of Q. (In other words, Q and M, cannot coincide 
because they “look different” at n.) 0 
A function f from Nk to N h is said to be arithmetic if its graph is an arithmetic subset 
of Nk+h. 
Lemma B.5. The image and preimage of an arithmetic set under an arithmetic function 
are arithmetic sets. 
Proof. As a first case let us consider the image of an arithmetic set A c N under 
an arithmetic function f from N to N. This image is projection of the set (graph 
off) n (A x N), and so is an arithmetic set. In other words, if we let [f (x 1 ) = x2] denote 
the formula with which the graph off is associated and let [xi EA] denote the formula 
with which the set A is associated, then the formula 
is true for values of x2 belonging to the image of A and for no other values. So in order 
to find a formula with which the image of A is associated, it suffices to permute the 
variables (interchange xi and x2). 
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The preimage of an arithmetic set A under the functionf is associated with the 
formula 
where [.‘c~EA] denotes the formula obtained from [xi~A] by interchanging the 
variables x1 and x2. The general case of a function from Nk to Nh is proved in the 
same way. Cl 
We are interested in proving Tarski’s theorem, which says: r 
The set of true formulas of arithmetic is nonarithmetic. 
In order to make sense of this assertion, we have to explain what we mean by 
arithmeticity of a set of formulas, which is a subset of A”. This can be done as follows: 
choose a one-to-one correspondence between A” and N (a numbering of A”), so that 
each word X in A” is associated to some natural number (called the number of X in 
this numbering). We say that a set M c A” is arithmetic (with respect to the chosen 
numbering) if the set of numbers of the words in M is an arithmetic subset of N. 
Of course, this definition depends on the choice of numbering of the words in the 
alphabet A. We say that two numberings are arithmetically equivalent if the function 
which goes from the number of a word in one numbering to its number in the other 
numbering is an arithmetic function. 
Lemma B.6. If a set M c A” is arithmetic relative to a given numbering x1, then it is 
arithmetic relative to any numbering x2 which is arithmetically equivalent to 7~~. 
Proof. By assumption, rci (M) (which consists of all rc,-numbers of words in M) is an 
arithmetic set. Since the set rc2(M) is the image of x1(M) under the function which goes 
from ni-numbers to rc,-numbers, and since this function is arithmetic by assumption, 
it follows that n,(M) is also arithmetic. q 
Finally, we define an arithmetic set of words in the alphabet A to be a set which is 
arithmetic relative to some computable numbering of A”. (A numbering is said to be 
computable if the function which associates a number to every word is a computable 
function. In this case the inverse, which associates the word with number n to 
a natural number n, is also computable function. The existence of computable 
numberings of A” was established in Example 3 of Section 2). 
We now show that this definition can equally well be given in the form: an 
arithmetic set of words is a set which is arithmetic relative to any computable 
numbering of A”. If rcl and 7~~ are two computable numberings, then the function 
which goes from the rci-number of a word to its rc2- number is a computable function 
from N to N. (It can be computed by the following algorithm: given an argument x, 
run through all words in the alphabet A, compute their xi-numbers, and wait for 
a word to appear whose rri-number is x; once this word has been found, compute its 
rcz-number.) Thus, our claim follows once we prove the following lemma. 
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Lemma B.7. Every computable function from NP to Nq is arithmetic. 
Proof. The graph of a computable function from FV p to N q is an enumerable subset of 
NP+q by Corollary 3 of the protocol axiom. Hence, the lemma follows from the 
following strengthened form of the arithmeticity axiom: 
every enumerable subset of Nk is arithmetic. 
(In Section 5 we called the special case of this for k = 1 the arithmeticity axiom). q 
Theorem B.2. The set T of true formulas of arithmetic is not an arithmetic set. 
Proof. We shall show that if T were arithmetic, then a universal arithmetic set would 
exist, in contradiction to Theorem B. 1. Following Giidel, we shall call a formula class 
formula if it has no parameters other than x1. The set of all class formulas is 
a decidable subset of the enumerable set A”, and so is enumerable. We fix an 
enumeration txo, c(~, ~1~) . . . of the set of class formulas. We consider the set 
M = {(n, m) 1 the result of substituting m 
in place of x1 in ~1, is a true statement). 
Since the nth cross-section of this set is obviously associated with the formula CI,, it 
follows that the cross-sections of this set exhaust all arithmetic subsets of N. It remains 
to show that if T were arithmetic, then M would also be arithmetic. 
Recalling the definition of arithmeticity of a set of words, we fix an arbitrary 
computable numbering of A”. Let T’ be the set of numbers of words in T under this 
numbering. Let S be the function which associates to the pair (m, n) the number of the 
word which is the result of substituting m in place of x1 in CI,. S is a computable 
function, and so, by Lemma B.7, it is an arithmetic function. The set M is the preimage 
of T’ under the function S. Thus, the arithmeticity of T’ implies that M is arithmetic, 
by Lemma B.5. Theorem B.2 is proved. 0 
A close examination of the proof of Theorem B.2. reveals that it is connected with 
the “liar paradox”. We briefly explain this connection. 
The liar paradox is the following. Someone announces: “What I am saying now 
is a lie”. Is this statement true or false? Either answer to this question leads to 
a contradiction. If we say the statement is true, then, because of the very meaning of 
the statement, it must be false; and conversely. We now give a presentation of our 
proof of Theorem B.2 in a form which resembles this paradox. 
Proof. Suppose that the set of numbers of true statements of arithmetic is an 
arithmetic set. Let [word with number xJ is true] denote the formula which has one 
parameter x3 and which expresses the property “the word with number x3 belongs to 
T”, i.e., the property “x~ET”‘. The function S is arithmetic; we let 
[x3 is the number of the result of substituting x2 in the xlth class formula] 
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denote the formula with which the graph of S is associated. The formula 
3x,([word with number x3 is true] 
A [x3 is the number of the result of substituting x2 in the xrth class 
formula] ) 
has parameters x1 and x2. The set M is associated with this formula, which we shall 
henceforth denote by 
[result of substituting x2 in the x,th class formula is true]. 
The rest of the argument follows the proof of the theorem that there is no universal 
arithmetic set. We consider the formula 
13x,((x, =x2)/I 
[result of substituting x2 in the xrth class formula is true]), 
which we shall denote by 
[result of substituting x1 in the x,th class formula is false]. 
This last formula has one parameter x1, and corresponds to the set Q in the proof of 
Theorem B.l, in the sense that the result of substituting n in place of x1 in this formula 
is true if and only if the result of substituting n in the nth class formula is false. This 
formula is a class formula, and so has some number (which we denote n) in the 
enumeration of the class formulas. We now substitute n in place of x1 in our formula, 
and denote the result of this substitution by 
[result of substituting n in the nth class formula is false]. 
This is a closed formula which is true if and only if the result of substituting the 
number n in the nth class formula is false. However, this closed formula is nothing 
other than that very result of substituting n in the nth class formula. Thus, the closed 
formula 
[result of substituting n in the nth class formula is false] 
is true if and only if it is false. We would have been completely justified in denoting the 
statement: [I am lying]. We have obtained a contradiction, which shows that the set of 
true formulas of arithmetic is not an arithmetic set. 3 
Appendix C. The language of address programs, the extended language of arithmetic, 
and the arithmeticity axiom 
In this appendix we shall attempt to justify the arithmeticity axiom. Our plan of 
argument is as follows. First we shall describe a certain concrete class of algorithms 
~ the class of address programs. It is natural to use the term “address-computable” to 
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refer to functions which are computable using algorithms from this class. Next we 
shall prove that the range of values of any address-computable function is an 
arithmetic set. This will justify the arithmeticity axiom - provided that one believes 
that every computable function is address-computable. 
As an aid in carrying out this program we shall introduce an extended language of 
arithmetic, which has some additional means of expression not in the language of 
arithmetic that was described in Section 4. We shall show that the set of values of any 
address-computable function can be described by a formula in this extended language 
of arithmetic. Then we shall show that the use of this extended language was not 
actually essential, i.e, for every formula in the extended language we can find a substi- 
tute in the usual language of arithmetic. This will imply that the set of values of any 
address-computable function can be described by a formula in the language of 
arithmetic, i.e., it is an arithmetic set. 
We begin with the following simple observation: in order to justify the arithmeticity 
axiom (and even the strengthened version in Appendix B), it suffices for us to be able 
to prove that 
the graph of any computable function from N to N is an arithmetic subset of N’. 
(The definition of an arithmetic subset of N2 was given in Appendix B). To see this, 
suppose that this assertion is true. Then every enumerable subset of N is arithmetic, 
since it is a projection of the graph of the computable function which enumerates it 
(see Lemma B.4). We now prove from this that the strengthened version of the 
arithmeticity axiom holds. 
Let M c Nk be an enumerable set, and let g be the function from N to Nk which 
enumerates it. The value of y at the number y1 is a k-tuple g(n) = (yl (n), . . , g,(n)). The 
functions yI, . . . , gk are computable functions from N to N, and so, by our assumption, 
their graphs are arithmetic. We let [gi(xl) = x2] denote the formulas with which these 
graphs are associated. The graph of y is an arithmetic subset of Nk+’ because it is 
associated with the formula 
where we have let [gi(Xl)=xi+l] denote the formula obtained from [gi(x1)=x2] by 
the permutation of variables which interchanges x2 and xi+ 1. The set M is the 
projection of the graph of g onto the x2, . . . , xk+r-axes, and so is an arithmetic set. 
Thus, our goal is now to prove that the graph of any computable function from N to 
N is an arithmetic subset of FU2. This is not, however, a trivial task, as the reader will 
undoubtedly agree after trying to prove directly, for example, the arithmeticity of the 
exponential function to base 2, i.e., the arithmeticity of the set {(x, y) 1 y = 2”). 
C.1. The language qf address programs 
We now describe a class of algorithms of a special type, which we shall call address 
programs. These programs are reminiscent of real “machine language” programs used 
with actual computers. 
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An address program is a sequence of commands listed in order. Each command has 
one of the following forms: 
(1) R(a) t b (assigning a value); 
(2) R(a) +- R(b) (moving a value); 
(3) R(a) t R(b) + R(c) (addition); 
(4) R(a) +- R(b). R(c) (multiplication); 
(5) GO TO II (unconditional transfer); 
(6) IF R(a)=R(b) GO TO m ELSE GO TO n (conditional transfer); 
(7) STOP. 
Here a, b and c are arbitrary natural numbers (register numbers), and m and n are 
natural numbers which denote the order of a command in the program. The last 
command in any program must be a command of the form (7). We have given names 
for the types of commands in parentheses. 
Here is a simple example of an address program: 
Example 1. 
1 R(l)+1 
2 R(2)+ 1 
3 R(3)+1 
4 R(2)+R(2).R(l) 
5 R(l)+-R(l)+R(3) 
6 IF R(l)= R(0) GO TO 7 ELSE GO TO 4 
7 R(O)+R(2) 
8 STOP. 
Address programs can be executed on “address machines” (which exist only in 
theory). 
An address machine is assumed to have infinitely many locations for storing natural 
numbers (its memory). These locations are called registers. At a given instant exactly 
one number is stored in each register. The registers are numbered 0, 1, 2,. and are 
denoted R(O), R(l), R(2), . . , respectively. 
An address machine executes the program in the order that the commands are 
numbered; this order is violated only when a conditional or unconditional transfer 
command is executed. Before giving more precise definitions, we shall describe how an 
address machine goes through the program in Example 1. Suppose that we start with 
the number 100 in the register R(0) and zero in each of the other registers. The first 
three commands assign the initial value 1 to the registers R(l)-R(3). The number in 
the register R(3) does not change during the rest of the execution of the program, the 
number in R(1) increases by 1 from time to time (at command 5; recall that R(3) 
always stores the number l), and the number in R(2) is multiplied by the value in R(1) 
from time to time. The execution stops when the number in R(1) becomes equal to the 
number in R(0). Table 1 shows how the numbers in the registers change as the 
program is executed. 
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Table 1 
Command 
number 
1 100 0 0 0 0 
2 100 1 0 0 0 
3 100 1 1 0 0 
4 100 1 1 1 0 
5 100 1 1 1 0 
6 100 2 1 1 0 
4 100 2 1 1 0 
5 100 2 2 1 0 
6 100 3 2 1 0 
4 100 3 2 1 0 
5 100 3 6 1 0 
6 100 4 6 1 0 
4 100 4 6 1 0 
100 99 98! 1 
100 99 98! 1 
100 99 99! 1 
100 100 99! 1 
100 100 99! 1 
99! 100 99! 1 
As a result of the execution of this program the number 99! (1.2. ... .99) is put into 
the register R(0). If 200 rather than 100 were in R(0) at the beginning, then at the end 
we would have to fit the number 199! (1.2. .... 199) into our register R(0). And if all 
registers stored zero at the beginning, then the execution of the program would never 
stop. 
We now give some precise definitions. The state of an address machine is an infinite 
sequence of natural numbers s = (s,, , sl, . . . ) almost all of which (i.e., all but finitely 
many) are zero. If s0 = 0, then we call the state afinal state (or stop); if s0 2 1, then we 
call it a working state, and we call s0 the command number being executed. We call 
si+i the number in the ith register. 
Let p be an address program, and let s = (so, si, . . . ) be a working state. We say that 
p is applicable to the state s if s0 is the number of a command of p (there might not be 
a command with number s0 if s0 is too large). In this case we define a state s’ which is 
called the immediate result of applying the program p to the state s. This state 
s’ = (~6, s; , . . . ) is determined as follows: 
(1) if command number s0 has the form R(a)tb, then s&=sO+ 1, si+i =si+i for 
i#a,andsA+,= b (all registers except for the ath remain unchanged, the number in the 
ath register is replaced by b, and the machine moves on to the next command); 
(2) if command number s0 has the form R(a)cR(b), then sb = s0 + 1, sj+ 1 = Si+ 1 for 
i #a, and s: + 1 = sb + 1 (all registers except for the ath remain unchanged, the number in 
the ath register is replaced by the number in the bth register, and the machine moves 
on to the next command); 
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(3) if command number so has the form R(a)tR(b)+R(c), then $,=so + 1, 
s,!+r =s;+~ for ifa, and .$,+ 1 =s,,+~ +s,+~ (all registers except for the uth remain 
unchanged, the number in the ath register is replaced by the sum of the numbers in the 
bth and cth registers, and the machine moves on to the next command); 
(4) if command number s0 has the form R(a)+R(b).R(c), then .$=so+ 1, 
~,!+~=si+r for i#a, and s~+~=s~+,.s,+~ (same as (3) except with multiplication 
instead of addition); 
(5) if command number so has the form GO TO n, then sb=n, and s;+~ =.Q+~ 
for all i (all registers remain unchanged, and the machine moves on to the nth 
command); 
(6) if command number so has the form IF R(u) = R(b) GO TO m ELSE GO TO n, 
thensj+,=si+,foralli,and.~~isequaltomif.~,+,=s~+,andequaltonifs,+~#s~+~ 
(all registers remain unchanged, and the machine moves either to the mth or nth 
command, depending on whether or not the numbers in the ath and hth registers are 
equal); 
(7) if command number so has the form STOP, then sf+ 1 = si+ 1 for all i and .$, = 0 
(the machine goes to the final state). 
This completes the definition of the immediate result of applying a program to 
a state. We note that if p is applicable to the state s, then the immediate result of 
applying p to s is either a final state or else a state to which p is again applicable. We 
always assume that the numbers m and H in transfer commands are numbers of 
commands in the program, and that the last command is STOP. 
By a protocol for an address program p we mean a sequence of states so, si, . . , sk 
such that each state after so is the immediate result of applying p to the preceding 
state, and the last state is a final state. We call so the initial state of the protocol. There 
exists at most one protocol for a given address program and a given initial state; there 
might be no protocol, if either p is not applicable to so or there is no final state in the 
sequence of states obtained by successively applying p. 
Suppose that p is an address program and k is a natural number. We consider the 
function f from Nk to N which is defined as follows: the value off at the k-tuple 
(al, . . , uk) is h if there exists a protocol for p whose initial state is 
(l,~,,~*~ .“I ak,O,O, . ..) and if b is the number in the 0th register at the final state of 
this protocol. In other words, the value offat (ui, . , ak) is the number in R(0) after 
the execution of the program if ui , , uk were in R(O), . ,R(k- 1) and zeros were in 
all the other registers at the beginning of the execution of the program, and the 
program begins with command number 1. We then call ,f a function which is 
k-computuble by the program p (or simply computable by p if the value of k is clear 
from the context). 
Example 2. Let p the address program in Example 1. The following function jr is 
l-computable by this program: f; (0) is not defined, f;(i)=(i- l)! for i 3 1. The 
function f; which is 2-computable by p is as follows: f; (i, j) is not defined if i=O, 
fi(i,j)=(i- l)! if i> 1. 
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Functions which are k-computable by address programs will be called address- 
computable functions of k variables. It is obvious that all address-computable func- 
tions are computable. Also all known computable functions turn out to be address- 
computable. Thus, it is reasonable to conjecture that the class of computable functions 
from Nk to N and the class of address-computable functions are the same. Assuming 
this conjecture to be true, we shall now proceed to prove the arithmeticity axiom on 
that basis. 
C.2. The extended language of arithmetic 
As an aid in proving arithmeticity of address-computable functions we shall 
develop an extended language of arithmetic. In order to define this language, we have 
to introduce some modifications to the definition of the language of arithmetic in 
Section 4. 
We add two new symbols to the alphabet of arithmetic: c’ (for forming one-place 
functional variables) and w (for forming two-place functional variables). A word of the 
form (u”) will be called a one-placefunctional variable, and a word of the form (w”) will 
be called a two-place functional variable. (Here n > 1.) We shall use the notation v, and 
w, to abbreviate these one- and two-place functional variables. The interpretation we 
have in mind for one- and two-place functional variables is everywhere defined 
functions of one and two variables, where the variables and the functions take on 
natural number values. We shall call our old variables x, numerical variables. 
We define a term in the extended language of arithmetic as follows: 
(1) a numerical variable is a term; 
(2) if t and u are terms, then (t + u) and (t u) are terms; 
(3) if p is a one-place functional variable and t is a term, then p(t) is a term; 
(4) if r is a two-place functional variable and t and u are terms, then r(t, u) is a term. 
Example 1. The words (z)~(x~)+x~), u4(u5(w2(x1,x2))), and w2(w2(x1,x4), x,) are 
terms in the extended language of arithmetic. 
As before, an elementary formula is two terms joined by an equals sign (except that 
now the terms are in the extended language). The formulas of the extended language of 
arithmetic are defined in the same way as in Section 4, except that in (4) the variable 
i; can be either a numerical variable, a one-place functional variable, or a two-place 
functional variable. 
Example 2. The words Vu,(v1(xI)=u1(x2)), Vx,Vxz(u,(x,)=u,(x2)), and 
Vw1Vx1Vx2(w1(x1,x1)=w1(xz,x1)) are formulas. 
The parameters of terms and formulas are defined as in Section 4; parameters can 
include functional as well as numerical variables. 
Example 3. The parameters in Example 1 are u 4,x1 and x2 for the first term; 
U 4rv5r w2, x1 and x2 for the second term; and w2, x1, x4 and x7 for the third term. The 
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parameters in Example 2 are xi and x2 for the first formula; u1 for the second formula; 
and the third formula has no parameters. 
Formulas which have no parameters are called closed formulas of the extended 
language of arithmetic. 
We must now determine which are the true closed formulas of the extended 
language of arithmetic. We will have two different definitions of truth for the formulas 
of the extended language of arithmetic, i.e., two interpretations of this extended 
language. In one definition the functional variables can be any (everywhere defined) 
functions in one or two variables with the variables taking on natural number values, 
and in the other definition they can only be finite functions, i.e., functions which are 
nonzero only at finitely many values of the argument. In order to avoid having to give 
essentially the same definition twice, we shall refer to the class of admissible functions, 
by which we shall mean either the class of all functions or the class of all @rite 
functions. 
The definition of truth will be similar to that in Section 4. The new ingredient will be 
the case of a formula which begins with a quantifier with respect to a functional 
variable. Here we encounter the following problem: we would like to say, for example, 
that the formula Vua is true if, for all admissible values of v, the formula obtained from 
CY by substituting the values in place of u is true. However, our language is not 
equipped with anything that can be substituted in place of a functional variable. This 
dilemma can be resolved as follows: we must introduce functional constants into our 
language, one for each admissible function. 
We now give the precise definitions. We choose a set of symbols which is in 
one-to-one correspondence with the set of admissible functions. We shall call the 
symbols in this set functional constants which denote the corresponding functions. 
Each one is either a one-place or a two-place functional constant, depending on the 
number of variables in the corresponding function. We shall substitute functional 
constants in place of functional variables having the same number of arguments. By 
an evaluated term (or evaluated formula) we shall mean the result of substituting any 
functional constants in place of all of the functional parameters and any numbers in 
place of all of the numerical parameters in some term (or formula) of the extended 
language of arithmetic. This substitution is carried out in the same way as in Section 4, 
i.e., only occurrences of a variable which are outside of the range of action of 
quantifiers are replaced. A special case of an evaluated term is a constant term, i.e., one 
with no parameters (such a term is then also a term of the usual language of 
arithmetic). A special case of an evaluated formula is a closed formula of the extended 
language of arithmetic. 
We can now define the value of an evaluated term or formula in a way which is 
completely analogous to the corresponding definitions for constant terms and closed 
formulas in the usual language of arithmetic. The values of evaluated terms are 
defined as follows: 
(1) the value of (I”) is the number n; 
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(2) the value of an evaluated term of the form (t + U) is the sum of the values of the 
evaluated terms t and U, and the value of an evaluated term of the form (t . u) is the 
product of the values of the evaluated terms t and u; 
(3) the value of an evaluated term of the form y(t), where y is a one-place functional 
constant and t is an evaluated term, is the value of the function described by ‘/ at the 
number which is the value of the evaluated terms t; 
(4) the value of an evaluated term of the form s(t,u), where 6 is a two-place 
functional constant and t and u are evaluated terms, is the value of the function from 
RJ2 to N described by 6 at the pair (value of t, value of u). 
To define the value of an evaluated formula, we can now use the definition in 
Section 4 of the value of a closed formula in the language of arithmetic, replacing the 
words “closed formula” by “evaluated formula” and “constant term” by “evaluated 
term”, specifying in (7) and (8) that 5 is a numerical variable, and inserting the 
following two paragraphs: 
(9) the evaluated formula 35a, where 5 is a functional variable, is true if there exists 
a functional constant y with the same number of arguments as 5 and having the 
property that the evaluated formula S$ is true; if no such functional constant exists, 
then the evaluated formula Cl~$c( is false; 
(10) the evaluated formula Vtc(, where c is a functional variable, is true if, for every 
functional constant y with the same number of arguments as 5, the evaluated formula 
S$ is true; otherwise the evaluated formula V<LI is false. 
Now that we have defined the value of an evaluated formula, we know how to 
determine the value of a closed formula of the extended language of arithmetic as 
a special case. This special case will be especially important for us later on. 
Example 4. The closed formula 
which says “if the values of all admissible functions at x1 and x2 are the same, then 
x1 =x2”, is true for either of the two interpretations of the set of admissible functions 
(all functions or only finite functions). 
Example 5. The closed formula 
which says that “every admissible function is equal to 0 for all sufficiently large values 
of the argument”, is true if admissible functions are the finite functions, and it is false if 
the class of admissible functions consists of all functions. 
Example 6. The closed formula 
is true for either interpretation of admissible functions. 
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Example 7. The following closed formula says that there exists an admissible 
one-to-one correspondence between N* and N: 
3w,(v’x,3x*3,u,(w,(x*,x,)=x,) 
A vx*vx,vX4vx5((w, (.x*,x3)=“1 (x,,xg))+((.x* =x4) A (Xj =x5)))). 
It is true if we take all functions to be admissible, and it is false if we take only the finite 
functions. 
Example 8. The statement that “the inequality 2”‘>x, holds for all x1” can be 
translated into the following formula in the extended language of arithmetic (with 
either of the two interpretations of admissible functions): 
A ~.‘(*(cx2~~11-(~1((~2 + 1))=(2.u,(x,)))))-,Cx, <fill). 
Here [x2dx,] denotes the formula 3.x3((x2+xj)=x1), and [xi <v,(x,)] denotes the 
formula 3x, ((xi +.x3) = U, (x 1 )). This closed formula can be read as follows: “if vi is the 
sequence of natural numbers whose first term is 1 and each of whose successive terms 
through the (x1 + 1)th term is twice the previous one, then v,(x,)~x,“. The stipula- 
tion “through” the (xi + 1)th term” is necessary if only finite functions are admissible. 
In Appendix B we interpreted formulas in the language of arithmetic which have 
parameters as expressing properties of the natural numbers. In the same way we may 
regard formulas in the extended language of arithmetic as expressing properties of 
natural numbers and functions. 
Example 9. The formula 
expresses the following property: the value of the admissible function o1 at the number 
xi is not less than its value at the number .x2. This last statement is not phrased 
completely correctly, since u1 is a functional variable and not a function, and xi and 
x2 are numerical variables and not numbers. The phrasing is an abbreviated way of 
saying, “The result of substituting numbers n, and n2 in place of xi and x2 and 
substituting a functional constant describing an admissible function in place of r1 is 
a true evaluated formula of the extended language of arithmetic (with either of the two 
interpretations of admissible functions) if and only if the value of this admissible 
function at n, is no less than its value at n2”. 
Example 10. The formula 
vx,vx,3x,((L~,(x,)+x,)=v,((.x, +x2))) 
expresses the property that “the admissible function u1 is a nondecreasing function”. 
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Even if we only look at formulas in the extended language of arithmetic which have 
no functional parameters, we still have new possibilities that were absent in the earlier 
language of arithmetic. 
Example 11. The formula 
301 (((u1(0)= 1) 
where [x3 <xi] is, of course, an abbreviation for 3x2 ((x3 +x2)=x,), expresses the 
property mentioned at the beginning of Appendix C: “x2 = 2”‘“. This holds for either 
of the two interpretations of admissible functions; if all functions are admissible, then 
we do not need the stipulation [x3<x1]. 
The properties of natural numbers which are expressible by formulas in the extended 
language of arithmetic will be called analytic properties or weakly analytic properties, 
depending on whether we are taking the admissible functions to be all functions or only 
the finite functions. We shall identify properties with the sets of objects having the 
properties, and so shall also speak of analytic and weakly analytic sets. 
More precisely, let cx be a formula in the extended language of arithmetic not having 
any functional parameters and not having any numerical parameters other than 
x1, . . ,xk. Let n,, . . . , nk be a set of k numbers. If we substitute these numbers in place 
of the respective variables xi, . . , xk, we obtain a closed formula in the extended 
language of arithmetic. We shall say that the set of k-tuples (nl, , nk) for which this 
closed formula is true is associated with the formula z (if we are taking all functions to 
be admissible) or weakly associated with a (if only the finite functions are admissible). 
A set which is associated (or weakly associated) with a formula in the extended 
language of arithmetic will be called an analytic set (respectively, a weakly analytic set). 
Example 12. As Example 11 shows, the set {(xi, x2) 1 x2 =2X’} is both analytic and 
weakly analytic. 
Any arithmetic set is obviously both analytic and weakly analytic. We shall later 
prove that all weakly analytic sets are arithmetic. However, not all analytic sets are 
arithmetic. It can be shown that the set of numbers of the true statements in the 
language of arithmetic (in any computable numbering of A”) is analytic; but this set is 
not arithmetic, by Tarski’s theorem (see Appendix B). We note in passing that an 
argument similar to the proof of Tarski’s theorem can be used to show that the set of 
all closed formulas in the extended language of arithmetic which are true when one 
takes all functions to be admissible, is not an analytic set. 
In the next subsection we prove that the graph of any address-computable function 
is a weakly analytic set. When combined with the result mentioned above about 
arithmeticity of any weakly analytic set, this will allow us to conclude that any 
address-computable function is arithmetic. 
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C.3. Expressibility of address-computable ,functions in the extended language of 
arithmetic. 
In this subsection we shall prove that the graph of any address-computable function 
is a weakly analytic set. Later (in Sections C.44C.6) we shall prove that any weakly 
analytic set is arithmetic; this will then complete the proof that address-computable 
functions are arithmetic, and so sets which are enumerated by such functions are also 
arithmetic. 
Let p be an address program. We shall prove that certain properties connected with 
the program p are expressible in the extended language of arithmetic. In what follows, 
when we refer to the truth of evaluated formulas in the extended language of 
arithmetic, we shall always be interpreting admissible functions to be only the finite 
functions. 
Recall that an address machine state is a sequence of natural numbers all but 
finitely many of which are zero. Such state is nothing more nor less than a finite 
function. 
Lemma C.l. The property “the state v2 is the immediate result of applying the program 
p to the state v1 ” is expressible in the extended language of arithmetic. (This means that 
there exists a .formula u in the extended language of arithmetic with the one-place 
functional variables v1 and v2 as its parameters such that the result of substituting two 
functional constants describing finite functions in place of v1 and v2 is true evaluated 
formula tf and only tf the state described by the second functional constant is the 
immediate result of applying the program p to the state described by the first functional 
constant.) 
Proof. Given a program p, we shall describe how to construct the required formula. 
(Of course, the formula itself will depend on p.) Our formula c( will have the form 
CIi A ... A SI, (where it makes no difference how the parentheses, which we have 
omitted, are inserted). Here n is the number of commands in the program, and the 
formula zi corresponds to the ith command. Each rli is one of seven types of formulas, 
depending on which of the seven types of commands for address machines is the ith 
command in the program. The formulas are constructed by following along the seven 
parts of the definition of the immediate result of applying an address program. We 
shall explain how this is done using two examples. 
Example 1. Suppose that command 37 has the form 37 
R(16)+R(2).R(16). 
In this case the formula a37 is as follows: 
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Example 2. Suppose that command 81 has the form 
81 IF R(3)=R(4) GO TO 7 ELSE GO TO 23. 
In this case formula as1 is as follows: 
(u,(0)=81)+(Vxi(uz(xi+1)=v~(xi+l)) 
A (((7~1(4)=a1(5))+(t0)=7)) A (~(~~(4)=~i(9)+(~~(0)=23)))). 
This completes the proof of the lemma. 0 
Our next step is to construct a formula which expresses the property of “being 
a protocol for applying an address program p of length xi + 1”. A protocol is 
a sequence of states, i.e., a sequence of finite functions. 
Our language does not have sequences of functions as such, but it does have objects 
which amount to the same thing. Namely, we shall identify a sequence of functions 
s”,sl, . . . of one variable with the function S(n, m) of two variables, which is defined by 
setting S(n, m) = s”(m). Thus, we shall say that an everywhere defined function S from 
N2 to N describes a protocol for a program p of length k + 1 if the sequence so, . . , sk of 
functions of one variable which are defined by setting si(x)=S(i, x) is a protocol for 
applying the address program p. 
Lemma C.2. There exists a formula /I which has a two-place functional variable wl, two 
one-place functional variables u1 and v2, and a single numerical variable x1 as its 
parameters and which expresses the following property: 
“wl describes a protocol of length x1 + 1, 
vi is the initial state of this protocol, and 
u2 is the jinal state of this protocol”. 
Proof. The desired formula has the following form: 
-+[uq is the immediate result of applying p to us]). 
Here [ul=w?] is an abbreviation for the formula VxJ(ul(xJ)=wl(O,xg)); 
[Uq=W;Zfl ] is an abbreviation for Vxx(uq(x3)=w1((x2+ 1),x3)), and [u2=w;‘] and 
[u3 = wT2] are to be interpreted analogously; and, finally, [Us is the immediate result of 
applying p to v3] denotes the formula in Lemma C.l with the variables ui and 
u2 replaced by uj and uq, respectively. 0 
We are now ready to prove that the graph of an address-computable function is 
weakly analytic. 
290 V.A. Uspensky 
Theorem C.l. The graph qf an address-computable,function from fUk to N is a weakly 
analytic set. 
Proof. Letf be an address-computable function from Nk to N and let p be an address 
program which computes f: The graph of f consists of the (k+ 1)-tuples 
(x 1, . . . , xk, xk + 1 ) for which there exists a protocol w1 of some length with initial state 
v, and final state v2 such that 
vi(o)= 1, ~‘~(l)=x~, .. ..vI(k)=xk. 
vi(x)=0 for x>k+ 1, 2:2(1)=xk+l. 
If we write all this as a formula in the extended language of arithmetic, we obtain the 
desired formula ~ a formula with which the graph off is weakly associated. The 
theorem is proved. 0 
In the next subsections, C.4-C.6, we prove that any weakly analytic set ~ and hence 
the graph of any address-computable function - is an arithmetic set. 
C.4. Reducing the extended language qf arithmetic to the usual language of arithmetic. 
In this subsection we shall prove that any weakly analytic set is arithmetic, i.e., that 
adding to the language of arithmetic variables which run through all the jnite 
functions of one or two natural variables does not increase the expressive possibilities 
of the language. As noted above, the condition that the functions be finite is essential: 
adding variables which run through all functions does result in a significantly more 
expressive language. 
We first give a rough explanation of why the addition of variables denoting finite 
functions does not have any essential effect. The point is that these functions form 
a countable set, they can be labeled by the natural numbers (and this labeling turns 
out to be arithmetic in a sense that will be made precise below), and then we can speak 
of a function’s label rather than the function itself. In this way we can limit ourselves to 
working with the natural numbers. 
We now make this more precise. Suppose that v is a map which associates an 
everywhere defined finite function of one variable to every element of Nk, i.e., to every 
k-tuple of natural numbers. We call such a map a labeling qf the3nite functions ofone 
variable by means qf elements of Nk if each finite function corresponds to at least one 
(and perhaps more) elements of Nk. If a k-tuple (a,, , ak) corresponds to a function 
s, then we call this k-tuple a label for s (in the particular labeling system). We say that 
a labeling is arithmetic if the set 
{ (a,, . . , ak, x, y ) 1 the value of the finite function with label 
<a 1, ... 3 ok) at the number x is equal to y} 
is an arithmetic set. 
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The key step in our proof that weakly analytic sets are arithmetic is the following 
claim: 
(*) for some k there exists an arithmetic labeling of the finite functions by means of 
elements of Nk. 
In Sections C.5 and C.6 we shall give two different proofs of this claim. In the 
remainder of Section C.4 we shall show how the claim implies arithmeticity of weakly 
analytic sets. 
We could give a definition of an arithmetic labeling of everywhere defined finite 
functions of two variables by analogy with the above definition of an arithmetic 
labeling of finite functions of one variable. It turns out that the existence of such 
a labeling follows from the existence of an arithmetic labeling for finite functions of 
one variable. Namely, if we want to label a function f from NZ to N, we first label its 
“cross-sections”, i.e., the functions fn(x) =f (n, x), and we then label the sequence made 
up from the labels of the cross-sections. More precisely, we have the following easily 
proved lemma. 
Lemma C.3. If v is an arithmetic labeling of thejinitefunctions of one variable by means 
of elements of Nk, where (O,O, . . . ,O) is the label of the zero finite function, then the 
following function p is an arithmetic labeling of the finite functions of two variables by 
means of elements of Nk:p associates the k2-tuple (a:, . . ,a:, . . ,ai2, . . . ,ai2) to the 
function from N2 to N whose value at the pair (p, q) is 
It is easy to see that the restriction that (O,O, . . . ,O) be the label of the zero function 
is not essential. Any arithmetic labeling can easily be changed so as to have this 
property, by simply interchanging two labels; the resulting labeling is still arithmetic. 
Thus, we suppose that we have some fixed arithmetic labeling v of the finite 
functions of one variable by means of elements of Nk, and also some fixed arithmetic 
labeling p of the finite functions of two variables by means of elements of Nh. 
For each formula in the extended language of arithmetic, we shall construct its 
“translation”, which is a formula in the language of arithmetic which says the same 
thing as the original formula, but about the labels of functions rather than the 
functions themselves. For convenience, we shall add to the language of arithmetic 
some new variables for numbers: k new variables I’/, . . , V,” for each one-place 
functional variable vi in the extended language of arithmetic, and h new variables 
w;,..., W/ for each two-place functional variable Wi. Clearly, the class of arithmetic 
sets is not affected by this addition - it makes no difference what names one has for 
variables! We now give a precise definition of the translation of a formula. 
Suppose that c( is a formula in the extended language of arithmetic having numer- 
ical parameters xP1, . . . , xp,, one-place functional parameters vq,, . . , vq,, and two- 
place functional parameters w,, , . . . , w,>. Let /3 be a formula of the (usual) language 
of arithmetic whose parameters are a subset of {xP,, . . . ,xP,, V,‘,, . . . , 
292 V.A. Uspensky 
Vii, . , I’in, . . . , I$,,, W,?,, . . . , W:,, . . , W;, . , Wr”,}. Then /I is called a translation of 
c( if, for any natural numbers xP1, . . . ,xp,, V,i, . . . , I$,,,, Wr’,, . . . , W,!!, the result of 
substituting these numbers in place of the corresponding variables in /I is a true 
statement in the language of arithmetic if and only if the result of substituting 
x p,, .,. > ~,m,v(~,‘,,...~ q,,, ...,w;n, . . . . v,“,,, ~(W~,...,Wr”,,,....,~L(W,1,...,W~) 
(more precisely, numerical and functional constants which describe these numbers 
and functions) in place of xP,, . . . , xp,, vy,, . , uq,, w,, , . . . , wr, in the formula M is a true 
evaluated formula of the extended language of arithmetic. 
Theorem C.2. Every formula in the extended language of arithmetic has a translation. 
Before proving this theorem, we remark that a special case of the theorem - the case 
of formulas having no functional parameters ~ obviously implies our claim that 
weakly analytic sets are arithmetic: if a set is weakly associated with a formula in the 
extended language of arithmetic, then the same set is associated with the translation of 
this formula. 
Proof. Assuming for now that translations have been constructed for the elementary 
formulas in the extended language of arithmetic, we shall show how to build up 
translations of the other formulas. 
Lemma C.4. (1) If fl is a translation of a, then 1 /I is a translation of 1 cc; 
(2) Zf PI and pz are translations of a, and a2, then 
(PI A BZ)> (PI v 6)2)r (Bl’P2)r (P142) 
are translations, respectively, of the formulas 
(%I A a2), (XI v c(z), (a,-2), (~1++~2h 
(3) if p is a translation of GI and 0 is one of the symbols V or 3, then: 
Qx,~ is a translation cfQxicc, 
QV, . . . QV,“p is a translation of QvicC, and 
0 W) . . 0 W//? is a translation of QWiCr. 
This lemma follows immediately from the definition of a translation and the 
definition of the truth value of formulas. Because of the lemma, our task is reduced to 
translating the elementary formulas, i.e., formulas of the form (t = u), where t and u are 
terms in the extended language of arithmetic. If we replace this formula by 
35 ((t = 5) A (u = <)), where 5 is a numerical variable which does not appear in either 
t or u, and use parts (2) and (3) of the lemma, we see that it suffices to translate 
formulas of the form (t = 0, where t is a term and 5 is a numerical variable. We prove 
that such a translation can be constructed using induction on the number of steps in 
the construction of the them t: 
(1) if t is a variable or number, then the formula is its own translation; 
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(2) if t is (ur +uz), then we replace the formula ((a1 +u*)= 5) by 
where ylr and q2 are numerical variables different from 5 and not occurring in t, and 
then use the induction assumption and Lemma C.4; 
(3) the case when t is of the form (ul. u2) is analogous to (2); 
(4) if t is p (a), where u is a term and p is a one-place functional variable, then we first 
replace the formula (p(u)= 4) by 3q((u =q) A (p(q)= 5)) where q is a numerical 
variable different from 5 and not occurring in U; hence, it suffices to be able to translate 
a formula of the form (p(q) = <), and this is possible because of our assumption that the 
labelling is arithmetic; 
(5) the case when t is of the form r(u1,u2), where u1 and u2 are terms and r is 
a two-place functional variable, is analogous to (4). 0 
Example 1. A translation of the formula 
is: 
Vxr 3x2( [the value of the one-place function with label (V,‘, . . . , V;) 
at the number x1 is xz] A [the value of the one-place function 
with label ( Vi, . . . , Vi) at the number x1 is x2]), 
where the bracketed notation denotes the formulas in the language of arithmetic 
which express the properties described there. These formulas exist because the 
labelling is arithmetic. 
Thus, in order to complete the proof that weakly analytic sets are arithmetic, it 
remains only to construct an arithmetic labeling of the finite functions of one variable. 
C.5. First method of constructing an arithmetic labeling - Giidel’s Method 
We begin with the following observation: it is enough to prove that there exists an 
everywhere defined arithmetic function fi(xr , . . . , xi, y) with the following property: 
(*) for every finite sequence of natural numbers n,, ,.. , nk there exist a,, . . . ,ai such 
thatP(a,,..., ai,O)=n,,/?(al,..., ai,l)=n, ,..., fi(ul,..., a,,k)=nk.(Herethevaluesof 
B(a r, . . . , ui, y) for y > k can be arbitrary.) Suppose that fi has this property. Let v be the 
map which to every (i + 1)-tuple (x1, . . . , xi, h) associates the finite functon s(y), which 
equals p(xr , . . . , Xi, y) for y < h and equals 0 for y > h. Then v is an arithmetic labeling 
of the finite functions of one variable by means of elements of N’+‘: it is a labeling 
because of (*), and it is arithmetic because /I is an arithmetic function and the 
condition y<h is an arithmetic property. 
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Thus, it suffices to construct a function of i+ 1 variables satisfying (*) for some 
natural number i. Following Godel, we take our function to be 
fi(x1,x2,y)=(the remainder when xi is divided by x2(y+ l)+ 1). 
The arithmeticity of this function follows from the arithmeticity of the property “x3 is 
the remainder when x1 is divided by x2”, which is expressed by the formula 
[x3 <x2] A 3x,(x, = ((x2. x4)+x3)), where [x3 <x2] denotes the formula 
3x5(((x3 +x5)+ 1)=x2). To prove (*), we must use some simple facts from number 
theory, whose proofs can be found in most introductory textbooks on the subject. For 
the rest of this subsection we shall say “number” when we mean “natural number”. 
A number a is called a divisor of a number b if b = ac for some c. If a is a divisor of 
b and c, then it is a divisor of b+c and of b-c. A prime number is a number p> 1 
which has no divisors other than 1 and p. Every number can be written as a product of 
prime factors, and in essentially only one way, i.e., two factorizations can differ only in 
the order one writes the prime factors. If a product of several numbers is divisible by 
a prime p, then at least one of the factors is divisible by p. Two numbers a and b are 
said to be relatively prime if they have no divisors in common except for 1. The 
numbers a and b are relatively prime if and only if their factorizations into a product 
of primes have no prime factors in common. If a 1, . , a, are pairwise relatively prime, 
and if b is divisible by each a,, then b is divisible by a, ‘u2. ... .a,,. 
Suppose that uO, . . . , uk are pairwise relatively prime. We now consider the question: 
what (k + 1)-tuples (rO, . . , rk) of remainders are possible when a number x is divided 
by uo,...,ak. 7 The remainder when x is divided by ai is one of the numbers 
O,l,...,ai-l; thus, there are ~,.a,~..~ . ak possible (k+ 1)-tuples of remainders. The 
next lemma says that all these possibilities actually occur. 
Lemma C.5 (The Chinese remainder theorem). Suppose that uo, . , uk are puirwise 
relatively prime, and ro, . . . , rk satisfy ri < Ui for all i. Then there exists a number x having 
remainder ri when divided by ai, for each i. 
Proof. We shall call two numbers equivalent if they give the same remainders when 
divided by each of the ai. If two numbers are equivalent, then their difference is 
divisible by each Ui, and hence by a,. ... .uk (here we use the relative primality of the 
Ui). Thus, no two of the numbers 0, 1, . . , uo. ... uk - 1 are equivalent, i.e., each of these 
numbers has a different (k+ l)-tuple of remainders. However, there are exactly as 
many of these numbers as there are possible (k+ l)-tuples of remainders. Thus, any 
(k+ 1)-tuple (rO, . . . , rk) for which ri <ai for each i is a (k+ 1)-tuple of remainders 
obtained by dividing some x by a,, . , uk. 
Lemma C.6. For any n we can find a number b such that b + 1, 2b + 1, . . , nb + 1 are 
puirwise relatively prime. The number b can be chosen to be larger than any number 
specified in advance. 
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Proof. We first note that if p is a common prime divisor of kb + 1 and hb + 1, then p is 
a divisor of their difference (k-h) b. However, p cannot divide b, since if it did would 
obtain a remainder of 1 when kb+ 1 or hb + 1 is divided by p. Hence, k-h is divisible 
by p. From this it follows that b + 1, . . , nb + 1 will be relatively prime if they have no 
common divisors less than n. This can be accomplished, for example, by taking b to be 
a multiple of 1 ‘2. . . . . n; then the numbers b + 1, . , nb + 1 will each give a remainder 
of 1 when divided by any number from 2 to n. This completes the proof of the 
lemma. 0 
We can now easily prove the property (*) for our function fl. Namely, suppose that 
n,, ,nk are arbitrary natural numbers. We have to find xi and x2 such that the 
remainder when x1 is divided by x2(i+ l)+ 1 is ni for i< k. According to Lemma C.6, 
we can find x2 such that the numbers x2 + 1, . ,x2 (k + 1) + 1 are pairwise relatively 
prime and x2 is greater than any of the numbers no, . . . , nk. It finally remains to choose 
x1 using Lemma C.5. 
This completes the construction of an arithmetic labeling by Giidel’s method. In the 
next subsection we shall look at another method of constructing an arithmetic 
labeling, without the use of number-theoretic considerations. This second method is 
due to R.M. Smullyan (see his book Theory qfForma1 Systems, Princeton, 1961). 
C.6. Second method of constructing an arithmetic labeling ~ Smullyan’s method 
We first introduce the notion of an arithmetic labeling of finite subsets of IQ by 
natural numbers, which is analogous to the notion of a labeling of finite functions by 
means of elements of N ‘. Namely, a function r which associates a subset of N to every 
natural number is called a labeling if every finite subset of IV is the value of r at some 
natural number. If t (y) = A, we shall call y the label of the set A (relative to the labeling 
5). A labeling is said to be arithmetic if the set 
is an arithmetic subset of N2. 
Note that we do not require that all of the subsets corresponding to natural 
numbers be finite. (Here the analogy with definition of a labeling of finite functions 
breaks down.) 
We shall later show that arithmetic labelings of the finite subsets of K4 by natural 
numbers exist. However, before proving this, we shall show how this fact implies the 
existence of an arithmetic labeling of the finite functions of one variable. Thus, 
suppose that we have an arithmetic labeling T of the finite subsets of IV by natural 
numbers. 
Lemma C.7. There exists an arithmetic function from N2 to N which is defined on all of 
N2 and takes distinct elements of N2 to distinct elements of N. 
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Proof. We take the function which takes a pair (n1,n2) to the number which is the 
smallest label of the set {nl, n, + n2}. In other words, the value of this function at 
(ni, n2) is equal to k if and only if n, m(k), n, + n2E$k), and number belonging to z(k) 
is equal to either n, or n, +n2, and any number less than k does not have this 
property. All of this can be written as a formula in the language of arithmetic, and so 
our function is arithmetic. That this function takes distinct pairs to distinct numbers 
follows easily from the definition. 0 
(Other arithmetic bijection: 
(X,y)H (x+Y)(x+Y+ l)+y 
2 
3 
check that it is really a bijection) 
We now construct an arithmetic labeling of the finite subsets of N2 by natural 
numbers. Namely, we let the number k correspond to the subset of fV2 consisting of 
pairs (x, y) for which u(x, y) belongs to the set r(k), where u is the function in Lemma 
C.7 and r is an arithmetic labeling of the finite subsets of N by natural numbers. It is 
easy to see that every finite subset of N2 corresponds to some number, and that the set 
((k, x, y) 1 the pair (x, y) is in the subset of N 2 corresponding to the number k} is an 
arithmetic subset of N3. (Of course, these two requirements are what we had in mind 
when we spoke of constructing an arithmetic labeling of the subsets of N2.) 
We are now ready to construct an arithmetic labeling of the finite functions of one 
variable by means of elements of N2. We must describe the function s that corresponds 
to the pair of natural numbers (k, h). Let A be the subset of N2 which corresponds to 
k under our arithmetic labeling of the subsets of N’. Given a number x < h, if there 
exist y for which (x, ~)EA, then s(x) is equal to the smallest such y; if no such y exists, 
then s(x) = 0. Given a number x > h, we set s(x) = 0. The function corresponding to any 
pair (k, h) is a finite function, since it is zero for values of the argument greater than h. 
To find a label for a given finite function s, we first take k to be the greatest number at 
which s has a nonzero value, and then take k to be the label of the set {(x, y) 1 x d k 
and y =s(x)>. If we write the definition of the labeling we just constructed as a formula 
in the language of arithmetic, we see that the labeling is indeed arithmetic. 
To complete the proof by Smullyan’s method of the existence of arithmetic labelings 
of finite functions, it thus remains for us to construct an arithmetic labeling of the 
finite subsets of N. In the construction we shall make use of the binary system for 
writing integers. 
The binary representation of a natural number (except for 0) always begins with a 1. 
If we agree to drop that initial 1, then we obtain a one-to-one correspondence between 
the set of all positive integers and the set of all words in the alphabet (0, I}. That is, the 
instruction “Take the number, add 1 to it, write the result in binary, and drop the 
initial 1” gives a one-to-one correspondence between the set of natural numbers and 
the set of words in the alphabet (0, l}, as in Table 2. 
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Table 2 
0 Empty word 
1 0 
2 1 
3 00 
4 01 
5 10 
6 11 
7 ooo 
8 001 
The words in the right column are in order of increasing length, with words of the 
same length arranged in alphabetical order. We shall call an integer in the left column 
the “number” of the word in the right column in the same row. In this numbering 
every set of (binary) words corresponds to a set of natural numbers. For example, the 
set of words consisting only of zeros corresponds to the set of numbers which are one 
less than a power of two. Using this numbering, we say that a set of words is 
arithmetic, meaning that the corresponding set of natural numbers is arithmetic. We 
shall also say that a property of words is arithmetic if the set of words satisfying the 
property is arithmetic. We similarly define the notion of an arithmetic subset of 
((0, l}“)“, the set consisting of all n-tuples of words, and speak of an arithmetic 
property of n-tuples of words. 
We now show that certain concrete properties are arithmetic. 
(1) The word X comes before the word Yin the above ordering. In fact, this holds if 
and only if the number of X is less than the number of Y. 
(2) The word X consists only of zeros. Here, by what was said above, it suffices to 
verify arithmeticity of the property of “being a power of two”, and this follows, as 
explained in Appendix B, from the fact that a number x is a power of two if and only if 
every divisor of x is either 1 or an even number. 
(3) The word X consists only of ones. In fact, a word consists only of ones if and 
only if the succeeding word consists only of zeros. 
(4) The word Y consists only of zeros and has the same length as the word X. In 
fact, this is equivalent to requiring that the number of Y be the largest among all 
numbers of words consisting only of zeros which do not exceed the number of X. 
(5) The words X and Y have the same length. This is equivalent to the existence of 
a word Z consisting only of zeros and having the same length as X and the same 
length as r; so arithmeticity follows using 4. 
(6) The word X is the concatenation of the words Y and Z, i.e., it is obtained by 
writing Z after Y to the right, X = YZ. This is the most difficult in our list of arithmetic 
properties. Here the argument requires that we recall our particular method of 
numbering words. Roughly speaking, this property is arithmetic because the number 
x whose binary representation is obtained by joining the binary representations of 
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y and z, is obtained by multiplying y by 2(length Of ‘) and adding z. Of course, we must 
take into account that our numbering system for words involves adding 1 and then 
dropping the first 1 in the binary representation. We now go through the argument in 
more detail. 
Let x, y and z be the numbers of the words X, Y and Z. This means that x + 1 is 
written as 1 X in binary, y + 1 as 1 Y, and z + 1 as 1 Z. Let u be the number of the word 
having the same length as Z but consisting only of zeros. Then u+ 1 in binary is 
100 . . . 0 (with length of Z zeros). If X is the concatenation of Y and Z, then 
multiplying y + 1 by u + 1 and adding (z + 1) -(IA + 1) gives x + 1. We can now conclude 
that our property is arithmetic, since a formula expressing the property in the 
language of arithmetic need only say: “There exists U, which is the number of a word of 
the same length as Z and consisting only of zeros, such that (y+ 1). (u + 1)+(2-u) is 
equal to x + 1”. The clause about having the same length as Z and consisting only of 
zeros can be expressed in the language of arithmetic, by 4. 
The arithmeticity of the property of “being the concatenation” easily implies that 
several other properties are also arithmetic. 
(7) The word X is the beginning of the word Y, i.e., there exists a word Z such that 
Y is the concatenation of X and Z. 
(8) The word X is the end of the word Y, i.e., there exists a word Z such that Yis the 
concatenation of Z and X. 
(9) The word X is a subword of the word Y. In fact, X is a subword of Y if and only 
if it is the beginning of an end of Y. 
(10) The word X is the concatenation of the words Y, Z and V. Here we note that 
X is the concatenation of Y, Z and Vif and only if there exists a word Wsuch that Wis 
the concatenation of Y and Z and X is the concatenation of Wand V. 
We can similarly prove for any fixed n that the property “Y is the concatenation of 
X1, . , X,” is arithmetic. 
We are now ready to construct an arithmetic labeling of the finite sets of natural 
numbers. Suppose that x and 4’ are natural numbers, and X and Y are the correspond- 
ing words. Let U be the longest word consisting only of zeros which is a subword of Y. 
We shall stipulate that the number x belongs to the set z(y) if the word 1 UlXl Ul is 
a subword of Y and U is not a subword of X. We now prove that z is a labeling of the 
finite sets of natural numbers. 
Suppose that (x1, . ,x,, 1 is a finite set of natural numbers, and (X 1, ,X,} is the 
set of corresponding words. Let U be a word consisting only of zeros which is longer 
than any of the words XI, . ,X,.We let Y denote the word 
lUlX,l UlX,lUl... lUlX,lUl. 
Then the number of the word Y will be a label of the set {x1, . . , x, ). This labeling is 
easily shown to be arithmetic, using the above list of arithmetic properties of words. 
This completes the construction of an arithmetic labeling by Smullyan’s method. 
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Appendix D. Languages connected with associative calculi 
In this appendix we shall look at examples of languages whose sets of true 
statements are relatively simple in structure. These examples are connected with the 
so-called “associative calculi”. 
An associative calculus in the alphabet L is an arbitrary finite set of rules which 
describe a type of transformation of words in L. These rules are called two-sided 
substitutions, or simply (since we shall not deal with one-sided substitutions) substitu- 
tions in the alphabet L. Each substitution in the alphabet L is written in the form 
where P and Q are words in L and the symbol f-) is not a letter of L. (For example, 
or tt er is a substitution in the Latin alphabet.) A substitution rule Pi--t Q means that 
whenever P occurs as part of another word it can be replaced by Q, and vice versa. We 
now state this more precisely in the form of some definitions. 
Given an associative calculus (i.e., a list of substitutions), we introduce the notion of 
contiguity and equivalence of words. Two words A and B are said to be contiguous, 
denoted A I B, if there exist words P, Q, X and Y such that (1) A = XP Y, (2) B = XQ Y, 
and (3) at least one of the substitutions P tt Q or Q ++ P is a substitution in the given 
associative calculus. A finite sequence of words (C,, . . . , C,) in the alphabet L is said 
to be a contiguity chain if we have Ci I Ci+ 1 for each i. Finally, we say that two words 
A and B are equivalent if there exists a contiguity chain (C, , . . . , C,) such that C1 = A 
and C, = B. 
Remark 1. If we form the quotient of the set L” by this equivalence relation, we 
obtain an algebraic system with an associative operation (coming from the operation 
of writing words next to one another). This explains the terminology “associative 
calculus”. 
Suppose we have a fixed associative calculus in the alphabet L. There exists an 
algorithm which, given any two words A and B in L”, determines whether or not they 
are contiguous. For example, we could obtain such an algorithm by running through 
all 4-tuples of words P, Q, X, Y of length no greater than the maximum length of A and 
B, and then checking conditions (l))(3). Thus, the set of all pairs of contiguous words 
is a decidable subset of L” x L”. However, it is not at all obvious, except in the 
simplest cases, that there exists an algorithm which determines whether or not two 
words are equivalent. 
Example 1. Suppose that L= {a, b,c} and the associative calculus is given by the 
following substitutions: 
ab++ba, ac ++ ca, bc++cb. 
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Here it is obvious that A and B are equivalent if and only if the number of a’s in the 
word A is equal to the number of a’s in B, and likewise for b and c. This associative 
calculus is an example of what is called a commutative calculus. 
In the general situation, it is not clear how to construct an algorithm which, given 
two arbitrary words, determines whether or not they are equivalent, i.e., whether or 
not there exists a contiguity chain connecting them. In fact, A.A. Markov and E.L. 
Post showed that it is possible to find an associative calculus whose equivalence 
recognition problem is undecidable (in other words, for which there is no algorithm 
which determines whether two words are equivalent). For a proof of the existence of 
such an associative calculus, see, for example, Kleene’s book Introduction to Meta- 
mathematics. Here we shall give without proof an example due to G.S. Tseitin. 
Example 2. Suppose that L = {a, b, c, d, e}, and the associative calculus is given by the 
following substitutions: 
ucttca, ad +-+du, bc++cb, bd ++db, 
ecu +-+ ce, edb tf de, cca ++ ccae. 
Tseitin showed that this associative calculus does not have an equivalence recognition 
algorithm. 
An associative calculus will be said to be decidable if there exists an algorithm which 
recognizes equivalence in the calculus; otherwise, the calculus will be said to be 
undecidable. Clearly, decidability of an associative calculus is equivalent to decidabil- 
ity of the subset of L” x L” consisting of all pairs of equivalent words (or decidability 
of the subset of all pairs of inequivalent words). 
Suppose we have a fixed associative calculus J in the alphabet L. We let T + (or T - ) 
denote the set of all words (in the alphabet L, = L u { * 1) of the form A * B, where 
AEL”, BEL”, and A is equivalent (or inequivalent) to B. Thus, T+ u Tp =L” x L” 
(we identify a pair (A, B)EL”’ x L” with the word A *B) and the calculus 3 is 
decidable if and only if Tf (or equivalently T-) is a decidable subset of L” x L”. 
Remark 2. Note that the set of Tf (or T-) for the caculus in Example 2 is a specific 
example of an undecidable subset of L” x L”. The characteristic function of this 
subset is then an example of a noncomputable function. 
Given any associative calculus in an alphabet L, we can now speak of two 
languages connected with it: the positive language, whose statements are all possible 
assertions that two words in L are equivalent, and the negative language, whose 
statements are all possible assertions that two words in L are inequivalent. In both 
cases the statements can be regarded as elements of the set L” x L”. In the positive 
language, the word A *B will be interpreted as asserting that A is equivalent to B; 
hence Tf is the set of true statements. In the negative language, the word A *B will be 
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interpreted as asserting that A is inequivalent to B; hence T- is the set of true 
statements. 
Recall that in Section 1.1.3 we agreed to define a language by giving a fundamental 
pair. Thus, suppose we have a fixed alphabet L and an associative calculus 3 in this 
alphabet. We shall call (L,, T+) the fundamental pair of the positive language 
connected with 3, and (L,, T-) the fundamental pair of the negative language 
connected with J. 
We shall be interested in whether there is a complete and consistent deductive 
system for (L,, T’) and for (L,, T-). We shall see that this question always has 
a positive answer in the first case, while in the second case the answer depends upon 
whether the calculus 3 is decidable. 
Lemma D.l. The set E of all contiguity chains is a decidable subset of L,” 
Proof. This lemma follows from the existence of an algorithm which determines 
whether an arbitrary pair of words in L” satisfies the contiguity relation. 0 
Theorem D.l. In any associative calculus the set of all pairs of equivalent words is 
enumerable. 
Proof. We define a funcion cp on L,” by setting 
for each word C1 * C2 * . . . * C,, where each Ci is a word in the alphabet L. Then two 
words A and B are equivalent if and only if A * B = q(C) for some contiguity chain C. 
That is, T+ = q(E), where E is the set of all contiguity chains. The set E is a decidable 
subset of L,“, by Lemma D.l, and so is enumerable (by Lemma 2 of Section 2). 
However, cp is obviously a computable function; hence, the set q(E)= T+ is enu- 
merable, as was to be proved. 0 
Remark 3. Thus, in an undecidable calculus the set T+ is an example of an enumer- 
able but undecidable subset of the enumerable set L” x L”. By Lemma 3 of Section 2, 
such a subset is also an example of an enumerable set with non-enumerable comp- 
lement. See also Remark 5. 
Corollary of Theorem D.l. There exists a complete and consistent deductive system for 
the fundamental pair of the positive language connected with an arbitrary associative 
calculus. 
Remark 4. To obtain the deductive system in the corollary, there is no need to refer to 
Theorem 1 of Section 2. We can simply choose the deductive system (L,, E, cp), where 
E and cp are as in the proof of Theorem D.l; it will be a complete and consistent 
deductive system for the fundamental pair (L,, T’). This deductive system is quite 
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natural from an intuitive point of view, since the best way to show that two words 
A and B are equivalent is to exhibit a contiguity chain connecting them. 
We now ask about a deductive system for (L,, T-). 
Theorem D.2. Given an associative calculus, the set qf all pairs of inequivalent words is 
enumerable zj’ and only zj” the calculus is decidable. 
Proof. We first recall that L” x L” is enumerable (see Example 6 in Section 2). 
Suppose that the calculus is decidable. Then T- is a decidable subset of L” x L”‘, and 
so T- is enumerable, by Lemma 2 of Section 2. Now suppose that, conversely, T- is 
enumerable. Since its complement Tf in the enumerable set L” x L” is also enumer- 
able, by Theorem D. 1, it follows by Lemma 3 of Section 2 that T- is a decidable subset 
of L” x L”‘. and so our associative calculus is decidable. 0 
Remark 5. Thus, if we have an undecidable associative calculus, T+ will be an 
example of an enumerable set with nonenumerable complement (in an enumerable, 
larger set). By Lemma 3 of Section 2, any such example is also an example of an 
enumerable set which is undecidable (relative to the enumerable, larger set). Thus, the 
existence of an enumerable but undecidable set, which we proved in Section 5, can also 
be obtained as a corollary of the existence of undecidable associative calculi. However, 
it should be mentioned that the usual proofs that some associative calculus is 
undecidable rely upon the existence of an enumerable undecidable set (this is true of 
Example 2, for instance). Thus, the latter fact should be proved without relying upon 
the existence of undecidable associative calculi. 
Corollary of Theorem D.2. There exists a complete and consistent deductive system for 
the fundamental pair of‘the negative language connected with an associative calculus if 
and only if the calculus is decidable. 
Given an arbitrary associative calculus 3 in the alphabet L, we now introduce its 
universal language, whose statements consist both of assertions that two words are 
equivalent and assertions that two words are inequivalent. Here we need a way to 
distinguish between the two types of statements. For this purpose we add one more 
letter 1 to the alphabet L, where we are supposing that 1, like the symbols +-+ and *, 
are not letters in L. We let L’ denote the alphabet L u { *,l ). Now we let 1 T- denote 
the set of all words of the form 1 P, where PET-. We set To = T+ UT T-, and form 
the fundamental pair (L’, T”). It is natural to interpret an element t of To as a true 
statement about the equivalence (if tE T+) or inequivalence (if tE1 T-) of two words. 
Theorem D.3. Given any associative calculus 3, the corresponding set To is enumerable 
if and only if the calculus is decidable. 
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Proof. If 3 is decidable, then T- is enumerable, by Theorem D.2, and so 1 T- is also 
enumerable (see Example 5 in Section 2). Then To is enumerable, by Lemma 5 of 
Section 3. Now suppose that To is enumerable. We form the set 1 L’” of all words in 
the alphabet L’ which begin with 1; this set is enumerable (see Examples 2 and 5 in 
Section 2). By Lemma 5 of Section 3, the intersection To nl L’” is enumerable. But 
To nl L’” =l T-. Hence 1 T- is enumerable, and then so is T- (see Example 5 in 
Section 2). However, then the calculus 3 is decidable, by Theorem D.2. 0 
Corollary. There exists a complete and consistent deductive system for the fundamental 
pair of the universal language connected with an associative calculus if and only if the 
calculus is decidable. 
Appendix E. Historical remarks 
One of the truly great mathematicians of the 20th century (and undoubtedly the 
greatest mathematical logician) was Kurt Giidel. He was born on 28 April 1906 in 
Brno, in what was Austria-Hungary and is now the Czech Republic. From the 1940s 
until his death on 14 January 1978, Giidel worked at the Institute for Advanced Study 
in Princeton. The name Godel is connected with the most important theorems in 
mathematical logic: the completeness theorem for predicate calculus (1930), the 
incompleteness theorem for arithmetic (1930) and the theorem on consistency of the 
axiom of choice with the continuum-hypothesis (1938). 
The completeness theorem for predicate calculus says that it is possible to find 
a complete and consistent deductive system for the language of the logic of predicates. 
More precisely, Giidel proved that a particular concrete deductive system (that was 
known before) fulfills this role. Thus, in that deductive system one can prove all true 
statements of predicate logic, i.e., any formula which expresses a “law of logic”; and it 
is impossible to prove any other formula. Here by a “law of logic” we mean a formula 
whose truth is preserved regardless of the meaning ascribed to the various names in 
the formula. 
On the other hand, the incompleteness theorem for arithmetic - to which the 
present book is devoted - says that we do not have this situation in arithmetic. Not 
only do all known deductive systems fail to be consistent or else fail to be complete, 
but it is inherently impossible to find a complete and consistent deductive system. As 
explained above in the main text, this means that there is no possible notion of 
a formal proof which would lead to all the truths of arithmetic and only the truths of 
arithmetic being provable. Below we shall state the incompleteness theorem in the 
form given by Gijdel himself. 
The theorem on consistency of the axiom of choice and the continuum-hypothesis 
says that set theory remains consistent if we add both the axiom of choice and an 
axiom expressing the continuum-hypothesis, provided that it was consistent before 
these two axioms were added. This theorem of Giidel’s was the first fundamental 
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result in the study of the consistency of the assertions of set theory. To a large extent it 
changed our way of thinking about the meaning of set-theoretic statements, and gave 
rise to a new line of investigation in mathematical logic. 
Giidel’s theorems are discussed in more detail in the books cited in Bibliography at 
the end of the book. Giidel was responsible for many other important concepts and 
results, such as the first definition (1934) of the notion of a recursive function 
(Herbrand-Giidel recursiveness). We shall not attempt to list all of Godel’s contribu- 
tions here, rather we shall use the remainder of this appendix to describe Giidel’s 
original formulation of the incompleteness theorem. 
Giidel’s famous paper “uber formal unentscheidbare Sltze der Principia Math- 
ematicu und verwandter Systeme I” (On formally undecidable propositions of Prin- 
cipia Mathematicu3 and related systems I) was published on pp. 173-198 of the first 
issue of Vol. 38 (1931) of the Leipzig journal Monatsheftefiir Mathematik und Physik 
(it was presented on 17 November 1930). A preliminary synopsis of the results was 
published in the Viennese journal Anzeiyer der Akademia der Wissenschaften in Wien, 
Mathematischnaturwissenschqftliche Klasse, no. 19 (1930) (report of meeting held on 
23 October 1930). 
In this paper Godel showed that for a large class of formal systems there must 
inevitably exist an undecidable statement, i.e., a statement such that neither it nor its 
negation can be derived from the axioms of the given system. The paper contained the 
following theorem (Theorem VI on p. 187): 
For every to-consistent recursive class K of formulas there exists a recursive 
class formula r such that neither v Gen r nor Neg(o Gen r) belongs to Flg(rc) 
(where L’ is a free vuriuble in the formula r). 
Some words of explanation are needed for this formulation. The discussion below 
will suppose that the reader has a rudimentary acquaintance with some facts from 
mathematical logic. 
Giidel’s theorem here is speaking of the formulas in a certain formal system P, 
which is constructed on p. 176-178 of the paper. Rather than taking the time for 
a precise description of this formal system, we shall be content simply to give the 
following quotation from Godel: “In essence, P is the system which is obtained if one 
supplements the Peano axioms with the logical structure of Principia Mathematics 
(with numbers as the individua and the ‘follows after’ relation as an undefined 
notion)” (p. 176). 
The italics of Godel’s theorem have a special meaning. They indicate that we are not 
speaking directly about symbol combinations in the formal system (variables, for- 
mulas, etc.), but are rather referring to the numbers of these symbolic expressions in 
some fixed numbering system (now called the Giidel numbering). For example, a class 
3 The epic monograph on mathematical logic by A. Whitehead and B. Russell, Principia Mathematics, 
Cambridge, 1925. 
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formula is a formula with one free variable. Hence, a class formula is a nonnegative 
integer which is the number of a class formula. 
The notation u Gen r stands for the number of the formula obtained by putting the 
universal quantifier and the variable with number u in front of the formula with 
number r. Neg(vGenr) is the number of the negation of the formula with number 
u Gen r, Flg(rc) denotes the class of numbers of the formulas which are deducible from 
the formulas whose numbers form the class K. (In the deductions the axioms can be 
used, so that here K can actually be regarded as being combined with the axioms of the 
original system.) 
We shall not define what “recursive classes” and “recursive formulas” are. These 
terms refer to the possibility of defining the classes and formulas under consideration 
by means of primitive recursive functions (which are called simply “recursive func- 
tions” in Godel’s paper). 
The property that a class of w-consistent is a stronger condition than simple 
consistency. (Later, Rosser strengthened Godel’s original formulation of the theorem 
by showing that o-consistency can be replaced with a weaker consistency condition.) 
Whereas a class is consistent if it is impossible to derive both a formula and its 
negation, a class is w-consistent if it is impossible to derive both a formula of the form 
“there exists x such that U(x)” and also all formulas of the form “not U(O)“, “not U(l)“, 
“not U(2)“, and so on. In the notation of Giidel’s paper, a class K ofjiirmuIas (i.e., 
numbers of formulas) is said to be w-consistent if there does not exist a classformulu 
a for which: (1) Neg(u Genu)EFlg(ic), and (2) Sb (u~(,,))EFlg(K) for all n. Here Sb(ug,,,) 
denotes the number of the result of substituting the formula with number Z(n) into 
the formula with number a in place of the variable with number 0; Z(n) is the number 
of n. 
Thus, Theorem VI says that for any class of formulas which satisfies certain 
conditions there exists a formula having a rather simple form such that neither this 
formula nor its negation can be derived from the class. Since Peano’s axioms of 
arithmetic are the central ingredient in the formal system P upon which this theorem 
is based (recall that the theorem refers to the formulas of this system and deducibility 
using the rules of this system), Godel’s theorem is often interpreted as a statement 
about the incompleteness of formal arithmetic. Here incompleteness should be under- 
stood from the syntactic point of view (See Appendix A). 
Remark 1. If we regard the system P as being formal arithmetic, then the incomplete- 
ness of formal arithmetic is only a very special case of Theorem VI obtained by taking 
K = 8. Here the theorem guarantees incompleteness provided that P itself is o-consis- 
tent, i.e., its class of axioms is o-consistent. In this special case Flg(K-) consists simply of 
the numbers of all formulas that are provable in P. 
Remark 2. To be sure, the undecidable formula in Theorem VI - namely, the formula 
with number u Gen r - does not have an arithmetic character, i.e., it is not written in 
the simplest arithmetic language. However, in this connection Godel’s paper contains 
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some important further results. On p. 193 we find the following Theorem VIII: 
In any formal system as in Theorem VI, there exist undecidable arithmetic 
statements. 
Here a formula is said to be “arithmetic” if it is constructed using variables indexed by 
natural numbers, the equality relation, and the addition and multiplication opera- 
tions. 
It should be noted in passing that the symbols =, + and . are not in the original 
alphabet of P. Thus, an “arithmetic formula” can only really exist in a suitable 
extension of P. In P itself these symbols must be regarded as abbreviations. For 
example, on p. 177 of Godel’s paper, the expression xi =y, is defined to be an 
abbreviation for the formula “.x217(x2(x1) 3xz(yI))“, where x217 is Giidel’s notation 
for what we denoted Vx2. (Giidel’s paper does not give the analogous definitions for 
x+y and x-y.) 
Remark 3. As Godel himself noted ( p. 190), his proof of Theorem VI not only applies 
to the concrete system P in his paper, but also for any system satisfying the following 
two fundamental properties: 
(1) the system’s axioms and rules of deduction can be defined recursively; 
(2) any recursive relation can be defined within the system. 
As Godel notes, these properties hold for the axiom systems of Zermelo-Fraenkel 
and von Neumann for set theory, and also for axiomatic number theory based on the 
Peano postulates and recursive definitions. Thus, there are undecidable propositions 
in each of these systems, as we see by setting K=@ in the theorem (see Remark 1). 
Of course, the incompleteness result for each of these systems requires that the 
system be w-consistent. In all concrete cases, this consistency should be viewed as 
a working hypothesis, which comes from our belief in the reasonableness of the 
system, i.e., our confidence that it is a true reflection of a certain reality. 
Appendix F. Exercises 
This appendix contains exercises for various sections of the book. The starred 
exercises are the more difficult ones. 
Exercises for Section 2 
2.1. Show that in any set the union or intersection of two decidable subsets is 
a decidable subset. 
2.2. Show that the union or intersection of two enumerable sets is enumerable. 
2.3. Show that if the graph of a function is enumerable ~ then the function is 
computable. (The converse is proved in Section 5). 
2.4. Show that if A c N is decidable (or enumerable), then {x I~xEA} is decidable 
(or enumerable). 
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2.5. Show that if A c N is enumerable, then B= (x I3kEN (kxgA)} is enumerable. 
(However, if 4 is decidable, it does not necessarily follow that B is decidable; see 
Exercise 5.16). 
2.6. Show that the set N3 of all triples of natural numbers is enumerable. 
2.7. Prove that a set A c N is enumerable if and only if it is a projection of some 
decidable subset R of the set N2. 
2.8. Show that if A is a decidable subset of B and C is a decidable subset of D, then 
A x C is a decidable subset of B x D. 
2.9. Prove that any infinite enumerable set P can be enumerated by a computable 
function without repetitions, i.e., there exists a computable function p defined on all of 
N such that P={p(O),p(l),...} and p(n)#p(m), when nfm. 
2.10. Let A be some set of natural numbers. We define the direct listing of A to be 
the function which takes 0 to the smallest element in A, 1 to the next smallest element 
in A, and so on. (If A is a finite set, then the direct listing is not an everywhere defined 
function.) Prove that A is a decidable subset of N if and only if its direct listing is 
a computable function. 
2.11. Show that an infinite enumerable set P c N always has an infinite subset 
which is a decidable subset of N. 
2.12. Let A and B be enumerable sets with nonempty intersection. Show that there 
exist enumerable sets A, and B, such that AuB=A,uB,, A,nB,=@ Ale A, 
B1 CB. 
2.13. Let P be an enumerable subset of N2. Show that there exists a computable 
functionffrom N to N which is defined on all x such that (x,y)~P for some y and 
whose value at such an x is one of those y’s (i.e., (x,,f(x))~P for all x on whichfis 
defined). 
2.14. Derive the fact in Exercise 2.12 as a consequence of Exercise 2.13. 
2.15. A set A of natural numbers is said to be computably injinite if there exists an 
algorithm which, given n, finds a list of more than n distinct elements of A. Prove that 
the following properties are equivalent: 
(1) A is computably infinite; 
(2) A contains an infinite enumerable subset; 
(3) A contains an infinite subset which is a decidable subset of N; 
(4) there exists a computable function from N to N which is defined on all natural 
numbers and has that property that f(n)~A and f(n)3n for all n. 
2.16*. Prove that there exists an infinite set which is not computably infinite. 
2.17. Prove that the following functionfis computable: f(n)= 1 if one can find at 
least n nines in a row in the decimal expansion of z;f(n)=O otherwise. (If we replace 
“at least” with “exactly” in the last sentence, then it is not known whether or not the 
resulting function f is computable.) 
2.18*. Is the following a decidable subset of N2: take all pairs (m,n) of natural 
numbers such that n#O and m/n <r? (Here e is the base for natural logarithms.) 
2.19*. Is the function which takes the natural number n to the nth digit in the 
decimal expansion of e a computable function? 
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2.20. Show that the following conditions on a real number x are equivalent: 
(1) there exists an algorithm which, given n, finds p and 4 such that q#O and 
IP/4-- I <l/n; 
(2) the set { (p, q) 1 q # 0 and p/q < x} is decidable; 
(3) the function which takes n to the nth digit in the decimal expansion of x is 
computable. 
If the conditions in Exercise 2.20 hold, then x is called a computable real number. 
2.21* (Continuation of Exercise 2.20). The sum, product, or quotient of two 
computable real numbers is computable; and any root of a polynomial with integer 
coefficients is computable. Prove these facts. 
2.22 (Continuation of Exercise 2.20). Prove that there exist real numbers which are 
not computable. 
Exercises for Section 3 
3.1. We say that an everywhere defined function f from K” to L” reduces the set 
A c K” to the set B c L” if the conditions XGA and fob are equivalent for all 
XEK~. (Thus, we “reduce” the problem of whether x belongs to A to the problem of 
whetherf(x) belongs to B.) Show that if B is decidable (or enumerable) and if there is 
a computable function which reduces A to B, then A is also decidable (or enumerable). 
3.2 (Continuation of Exercise 3.1). Show that if A is undecidable (or nonenumer- 
able) and if there is a computable function which reduces A to B, then B is also 
undecidable (or nonenumerable). 
3.3 (Continuation of Exercise 3.1). Show that a set X c N is expressible by means 
of the fundamental pair (L, T) if and only if there is a computable function which 
reduces X to T. 
3.4. We say that two sets A and B of natural numbers are almost everywhere equal if 
their differences A\B and B\A are finite. Prove that a set which is almost everywhere 
equal to a decidable set is decidable, and that a set which is almost everywhere equal 
to an enumerable set is enumerable. 
E.rercises for Section 4 
4.1. Add a new quantifier V, meaning “for all even” to the language of arithmetic. 
That is, V,,a is true if the closed formula S,’ c( is true for all even n. Show that the class 
of arithmetic sets does not change as a result of doing this. 
4.2. Let a, p and y be any closed formulas. Show that the following closed formulas 
are true: 
(a) (u A (u + 8) +P; 
(b) (a A (B V Y))-((e A P) v (a A 7)); 
(c) @MFV))t*((@ A P)-Y); 
(d) ((E+Y) A (P-I))-_(@ v B)-Y); 
(e) (((a +8)+%) -a); 
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(k) (a-p)t*((a+B) A (P-x)); 
(1) (cxV/3)-1(1~1A\fl). 
4.3. Let M be a formula having no parameters other than 5. 
Show that the following closed formulas are true: 
(a) V&z -+3<cr; 
(b) lV~cr++3<la; 
(c) l3&xov~lLY. 
4.4. Prove that the class of arithmetic sets remains the same if we eliminate the 
symbols V, -+,++, and 3 from the language of arithmetic (the symbols 1, A, and 
V remain). 
4.5. Show that the following sets are arithmetic: 
{x 1 x is divisible by 3}, 
{x I x is a power of 3}, 
(x 1 the last decimal digit in x is 7). 
4.6*. Show that the set {x 1 x is a power of 10) is arithmetic. 
4.7. Prove that any arithmetic set is associated with some formula which does not 
contain any numbers. 
4.8. Prove that there exists a set which is not arithmetic. 
Exercises for Section 5 
5.1. Show that the following properties are equivalent: (a) X is an enumerable set; 
(b) X is the domain of definition of some computable function; (c) X is the set of values 
of some computable function. 
5.2. Prove that for every computable functionfthere exists a computable function 
g with the following property: g(y) is defined if and only if y is in the set of values off, 
and in that casef(g(y))=y. 
5.3. Prove that if f is a computable function from N to N, then the set 
{x If(x)= 1986) is enumerable. 
5.4. Show that there does not exist a function from N2 to N which is universal for 
the class of all everywhere defined functions from N to N. 
5.5. Show that there does not exist a function from N2 to N which is universal for 
the class of all functions from N to N. 
5.6. Let c1 be a function from which no computable function can be everywhere 
different. Show that the set {x I a(a) = 1986) is enumerable and undecidable. 
5.7. Prove that there exists a nonenumerable set with nonenumerable complement, 
and that this set can be chosen to be arithmetic. 
5.8. Let F be a computable function from N2 to N. We shall call n the rzumber of the 
function F, relative to F. We shall say that the numbering given by a function F’ is 
reducible to the numbering given by F if there exists an everywhere defined comput- 
able function h from N to N which takes the F/-number of a function to the F-number 
of the same function, i.e., F,,,,,)= FL. Show that there exists a computable function 
F from N2 to N such that the numbering given by F’ is reducible to the numbering 
given by F for any computable function F’ from N2 to N. Show that a function with 
this property must be a universal function. Such functions are called principal 
universal functions. 
5.9. Let F be a computable function from N2 to N. Show that the sets {n 1 F, is 
defined on a nonempty set} and {H 1 F, takes the value 1986) are enumerable. 
5.10. Show that there is a computable function F from N2 to N such that the sets 
{H j F, is defined on a nonempty set) is an enumerable set with nonenumerable 
complement. 
5.11. Show that there exists an enumerable set P c FU’ whose set of lower points, i.e., 
{(x,y)l <x,Y)EP and VY’<Y((X,Y’)#P)) 
is a nonenumerable set. 
5.12. Let P be a subset of N x N. Let P, denote the set {x~ N / (n, x)EP}. Prove that 
if P is enumerable, then all of the P,, are enumerable. Show that there exists an 
enumerable set P such that all enumerable subsets of N occur among the P,. Such a set 
P is said to be universal for the class of enumerable subsets of N. 
5.13 (Continuation of Exercise 5.12). Prove that, if P is an enumerable set which is 
universal for the class of enumerable subsets of N, then the set {X 1 (x, y)$P) is not 
enumerable, and hence {.x I (x, y) EP) is an enumerable set with nonenumerable 
complement. 
5.14. Prove that there does not exist a decidable subset R of NJ2 such that all 
decidable subsets of N occur among the cross-sections R, = (.xgN / (n,x)~R}. 
5.15*. Show that there exists an enumerable set of natural numbers whose comp- 
lement is infinite but does not contain an infinite enumerable subset (i.e., the comp- 
lement is not computably infinite). 
5.16. Show that there exists a decidable subset R of N such that the set 
{x l3k~N (kx~R)) is not decidable. 
Exercises for Appendix A 
A.l. Prove that if A and B are not separable, then neither A nor B is decidable. 
A.2. Show that there exist three enumerable sets A, B and C such that any two of 
them are disjoint but inseparable. 
A.3. Prove that if A and B are enumerable subsets of N and A u I? = N, then A\B 
and B\A are separable. 
A.4. Show that there exist sets A, B c N such that there is no arithmetic set which 
separates A from B. 
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Exercises for Appendix B 
B.l. Prove that the projection of an arithmetic set on any set of axes (in the sense 
explained in Section 2) is an arithmetic set. 
B.2. Prove that the composition of arithmetic functions is an arithmetic function. 
Prove that if an arithmetic function has an inverse, then that inverse function is 
arithmetic. 
B.3. Prove that any arithmetic function from N to N has an everywhere defined 
arithmetic extension. 
B.4. Prove that the class of arithmetic sets is the smallest class which includes the 
sets in Example 6 of Appendix B and which satisfies Lemmas B.l-B.4. 
B.5*. We define the quantijer depth of a formula as follows: the quantifier depth of 
an elementary formula is 0, the quantifier depth of a formula of the form 1 x is equal 
to the quantifier depth of U; the quantifier depth of a formula of the form (a A fl), 
(c( V fl), (U -fi) or (H tf fi) is equal to the maximum of the quantifier depths of a and /I; 
and the quantifier depth of a formula of the form 3[c( or V/i”a is 1 greater than the 
quantifier depth of a. Prove that for any natural number k the set of true closed 
formulas of the language of arithmetic whose quantifier depth is no greater than k is 
an arithmetic set. 
B.6*. Prove that for any numbering of the closed formulas of the language of 
arithmetic and any numbering of the class formulas the two sets {n 1 the nth closed 
formula is true} and {(m, n, k) 1 k is the number of the closed formula obtained as the 
result of substituting n in place of x1 in the mth class formula} cannot both be 
arithmetic sets. 
Exercises for Appendix C 
C.l. Prove that the following functions are address-computable: 
(a) f(x) = 2”; 
(b) .0x, Y) = xY; 
(c) f(x) = the xth prime number; 
(d) f(x) = the sum of the decimal digits of x; 
(e)* f(x) = the xth decimal digit of e. 
C.2*. Show that the class of address-computable functions from N to N would not 
change if we limited ourselves to some fixed number of registers, for example, if we did 
not allow any registers with numbers greater than 100 to be used in an address 
program. 
C.3. Show that the class of address-computable functions would not be enlarged if 
we allowed commands with register numbers given indirectly, that is, commands of 
the form R(a)+R(R(b)) and R(R(b))tR(a). These commands say that the number in 
the register whose number is the number in register R(b) is transferred to the ath 
register, and conversely. 
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C.4. Show that the following sets are weakly analytic: 
(a) (<x,~,z)Iz=x~}; 
(b) {(x, y) 1 x is the yth prime number}. 
C.5. Prove that every weakly analytic set is analytic. (Show this without using the 
theorem on arithmeticity of weakly analytic sets.) 
C.6*. Prove that for any computable numbering of the words in A” the numbers of 
the true statements of the language of arithmetic form an analytic set. 
C.7”. Show that the class of analytic sets does not change if we eliminate the 
two-place functional variables from the extended language of arithmetic. 
C.S*. Prove that if all functions are taken to be admissible, then the set of true 
closed formulas of the extended language of arithmetic is not analytic, but that if only 
the finite functions are taken to be admissible, then the set of true closed formulas is 
analytic. 
C.9*. We say that a set P c Nk is address-enumerable if either it is empty or else 
there exist address-computable functions g 1 )..., gk from N t0 FV, defined On all Of N, 
such that P={(g1(n),...,gk(n))lnE~}. P rove (without using the protocol axiom) 
that the graph of an address-computable function is address-enumerable. 
C.lO*. Prove (without using the program axiom) that there exists an address- 
computable function from N2 to N which is universal for the class of address- 
computable functions from N to N. 
Exercises for Appendix D 
D.l. Suppose that L = (a, b}, and our associative calculus is given by the substitu- 
tions a ++ aa, b ++ bb. Is this associative calculus decidable? 
D.2. Prove that any associative calculus with a one-letter alphabet is decidable. 
D.3. Associative calculi are examples of the more general concept of calculi. This 
concept is perhaps as fundamental as the notion of an algorithm. The main difference 
between a calculus and an algorithm is that a calculus permits certain actions to be 
performed, whereas an algorithm prescribes such actions. If we replace two-sided 
substitutions by one-sided substitutions (which allow us to replace the left side by the 
right side, but not vice versa), then formulate a rule telling us which substitution 
should be formed and in what place in the word, and finally specify when the 
processing of a word will be considered to be complete, we are going from a calculus 
to an algorithm. (It is in this way that the normal algorithms used by A.A. Markov to 
prove the existence of undecidable associative calculi are obtained). In this exercise we 
shall consider an algorithm which is somewhat similar to this type. 
This algorithm is applicable to words in the alphabet {a, b}. It consists of the 
following instructions: 
(1) If the word begins with a, i.e., if it has the form aP, where P is a word, then 
transform it to Pb. 
(2) If the word has the form baP, then transform it to Paba. 
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(3) Repeat these transformations until a word of the form aaP is obtained. At this 
point the algorithm ends, and the result of the algorithm is the word P. 
What happens if this algorithm is applied to the words babaa, baaba, and abaab? 
D.4. Construct an algorithm which decides the associative calculus in the alphabet 
{a, 6, c} which is given by the following substitutions: 
b f-r act, 
ca t, accc, 
aa-, 
bb +-+, 
cccc c-f) 
where the right side of the last three substitutions contains the empty word. 
Appendix G. Answers and hints for the exercises 
In this appendix we shall give answers or hints for some of the exercises in Appendix F. 
2.2. See Section 3. 
2.3. If the graph off is { (p(n),q(n)) 1 ne N}, then f(x)=q (the least n for which 
p(n) =x). 
2.4. See Lemma 6 in Section 3. 
2.5. If A = {f(n) 1 nEN } and bEB, then B is the image of N3 under the function 
g defined by setting 
g(k,k,n)= 
i 
h if kh=f(n), 
b otherwise. 
2.6. See Corollary 1 of Lemma 4. 
2.7. If A = {f(n) 1 nE N}, then A is a projection of the set R = {(f(n), n) 1 ne N}. 
2.9. Suppose that the functionfenumerates the set P. We can obtain the desired 
sequence p(O), p(l), . . . from the sequencef(O),f( l), . . . by crossing out repetitions, i.e., 
discarding thosef(n) for which f(n)=f(k) for some k<n. 
2.11. Use Exercise 2.9 to write P as { p(O),p(l), . . . }, choose a computable mono- 
tonically increasing function (by discarding any terms which are less than earlier 
terms), and apply 2.10. 
2.12. Fix enumerations a and b of the sets A and B: A = {a(i) 1 HEN), B= {b(i) 1 HEN}. 
Consider the sequence a(O), b(O), a(l), b(l), . . . Put the numbers which first appear in 
the even places in the set A 1. Put the numbers which first appear in the odd places in 
the set Bi. 
2.13. Fix an enumeration of P. Then the value offat x is the number y such that the 
pair (x, y) appears in the enumeration of P earlier than all other pairs (x, z), i.e., all 
other pairs whose first element is x. 
2.14. In N2 consider the set (A x {O})u(B x {l}), and apply 2.13. 
2.15. Use 2.11 to prove (2) * (3). 
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2.16. We must construct a set I which does not contain a single infinite enumerable 
subset (see 2.15). The family of all infinite enumerable subsets is countable. Let 
W,, IV,, . . . be all such sets. We shall construct I in steps, where in the ith step we 
arrange for lI$ not to be a subset of I and for I to contain at least i elements. At the 
zeroth step we choose an element a0 in IV’, and agree that a0 will not be in I, thereby 
ensuring that IV0 QZ. At the ith step we choose an element ai in Wi which has not yet 
been included in Z (this can be done, since w is infinite, and only finitely many 
elements have been put in I in the course of the first i steps). By agreeing not to put 
ai in I, we ensure that Wi +Z. In order to be sure that Z contains at least i elements at 
the ith step, we proceed as follows: we choose any i numbers which we have not yet 
barred from membership in Z (this can, of course, be done, since only i+ 1 numbers 
have been barred from membership in Z when we are at the ith step). We take Z to be 
the union of the finite sets of i numbers chosen at the ith step. 
2.17. The function_/” either is identically 1 or else is one of the functions gi, where 
Sitx)= 
i 
1 for xbi, 
0 for x>i. 
All of these functions are computable. 
2.18. Yes, it is. If we compute e with increasing precision (for example, by means of 
the well-known series of reciprocal factorials), we sooner or later find out whether 
m/n < e or m/n > e. (Equality is impossible, since e is irrational.) 
2.19. Yes; see Exercise 2.18. 
2.20. It suffices to treat the case of irrational x, since all three conditions hold for 
rational x. 
2.22. The set of all real numbers is uncountable, whereas the set of all computable 
real numbers is countable, since the number of computable real numbers is no greater 
than the number of algorithms which compute them. 
3.1. See Lemma 6 in Section 3. 
3.2. This obviously follows from Exercise 3.1. 
4.1. This formula Vex,x can be replaced by the formula Vx,([x, even]-+cc). 
4.2. Consider all eight possibilities for the truth or falsity of the closed formulas 
a, p, 1’. 
4.4. Use the relations in Exercises 4.2 (parts (l), (j), (k)) and 4.3 (part (b)). 
4.5. See Examples 1,3, and 5 in Appendix B. 
4.6. See Appendix C. 
4.7. Any formula of the form (.x = n) can be replaced by an equivalent formula with 
no numbers. For example (x =0) is equivalent to (X+X=X); (x = 1) is equivalent to 
(x.x=x) A1(x+x=x); (x=2) is e uivalent to 3y((y= 1) A (x=y+y)) (where (y= 1) q 
is replaced by the equivalent formula without the 1); and so on. 
4.8. The family of all arithmetic sets is countable, whereas there are uncountably 
many subsets of N. 
Giidel’s incompleteness theorem 315 
5.1. See Corollary 1 of the protocol axiom. To prove that (a) -+(b), note that the set 
of values of an everywhere defined functionfcoincides with the domain of definition of 
the function g defined as follows: g(n)=(the least k for whichf(k)=n). 
5.2. See Exercise 2.13. 
5.3. This set is a projection of the set: 
(graph off)n(N x {1986}). 
5.4. If G is an everywhere defined function from N* to N, then the function 
g defined by setting g(x) = G(x, x) + 1 cannot be one of the functions G,. Hence G is not 
universal. 
5.6. If the set M = {x 1 a(x)= 1986) were decidable, then the function fl defined by 
setting 
/I(x)= 
i 
;g6 ;; ;zE? 
would be a computable function which is everywhere different from tl. 
5.7. Let P be an enumerable undecidable subset of N. Then 
(P x {O})u((N\P) x (1)) is the desired set. 
5.8. Let G be a computable function from N 3 to N which is universal for the class of 
all computable functions from N* to N in the following sense: any computable 
function from N2 to N occurs among the functions G, defined by the formula 
G, (x, y) = G(n, x, y). Consider the function F from N* to N which is defined by setting 
F(kx)=G(i”(k), rl(k),x), 
where 5 and q are the functions in the proof of Lemma 5 in Section 3. This F will be the 
desired function. 
5.9. They are projections of the set (graph of f) and the set (graph of f)n 
(N x N x { 1986)). 
5.10. Let f be a computable function from N ilo N with undecidable domain of 
definition. Set 
F(m,n)= 
i 
f(m) if m=n, 
undefined if mfn. 
5.11. Let K be an enumerable undecidable set. Then set P=(K x {O})u(N x { 1)). 
5.12. Take P to be the domain of definition of a computable function which is 
universal for the class of computable functions from N to N. 
5.13. If Q={xi (x,x)#P} were an enumerable set, then it would coincide with 
P, for some n; but this is impossible, since ~EQ t, net’,,. 
5.14. If R is a decidable subset of N2, then the set S defined by setting 
S = {x 1 (x, x)$R} is a decidable subset of N which is different from all cross- 
sections of R. 
5.15. The solution can be found in Section 8.1 of Rogers’ book [S]. 
316 V.A. Uspensky 
5.16. Let p(O), p(l), . . be a listing of the elements in the enumerable undecidable set 
P. Then R = { (p(i)th prime number) i I icN > is a set with the desired property. 
A.l. If A were a decidable set, then it would be a decidable set separating A from B. 
A.2. Take A, B and C to be the sets {x 1 a(x)=O), (x 1 a(x)= l}, {x 1 a(x)=2}, where 
!X is a computable function from which no computable function can be everywhere 
different. 
A.3. Use Exercise 2.12. 
A.4. A and B can be taken to be nonarithmetic sets which are the complements of 
one another in N. 
B.3. For an everywhere defined arithmetic extension of the arithmetic functionf, we 
can take the functionf”defined by setting 
ftn)= gf(n) if f(4 is defined, 
if f(n) is undefined. 
B.4. If a class of sets contains the sets in Example 6 of Appendix B and satisfies 
Lemmas B.l-B.4, then it contains the sets which are associated with formulas of the 
type (t = s) and the sets which are associated with all formulas which are constructed in 
the various ways from the elementary formulas, i.e., it contains all arithmetic sets. (The 
proof uses induction on the length of the formula with which a set is associated.) 
B.5. Prove this by induction on k. If k=O, the assertion follows because our set is 
decidable. The induction step from k to k+ 1 proceeds as follows. Let Bk be the set of 
true statements having quantifier depth at most k. Let Ak+ 1 and Ek+ 1 be the sets of 
true statements of quantifier depth at most k+ 1 which begin with the quantifiers 
V and 3, respectively. Use arithmeticity of Bk to prove that Ak+i and Ekfl are 
arithmetic. Then prove that &+ 1 is arithmetic. Note that as k increases the quantifier 
depth of the formula with which Bk is associated also increases. It can be shown that 
this is unavoidable, i.e., the quantifier depth of any formula with which the Bk is 
associated must increase without bound as k increases. 
B.6. Use the argument at the end of Appendix B. 
C.l. (a) Here is the required program: 
1 R(l)+0 
2 R(2)cl 
3 R(3) i-2 
4 R(4)+-1 
5 IF R(l)=R(O) GO TO 9 ELSE GO TO 6 
6 R(l)+R(l)+R(4) 
7 R(2)+- R(2). R(3) 
8 GOT05 
9 R(O)+-R(2) 
10 STOP 
(c) The general plan for constructing the required address program is given by the 
following flow-chart: 
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One can check whether R(1) is prime, for example, by running through all numbers 
less than R(1) and determining whether R(1) is divisible by any of them. 
(e) Use the reciprocal factorial series for e. 
CL?. A finite sequence of natural numbers can be represented by a single number. 
Thus, the operation of an address machine with infinitely many registers can be 
modelled on a machine with only 100 registers, if one of the registers stores the entire 
memory of the first machine (represented as a single number) and the other 99 
registers are used for the various computations needed to go from one machine to the 
other (such as coding the memory of the first machine by a single number, decoding 
that number, etc.). 
C.3. Using a technique similar to that in the hint for Exercise C.2, we can easily 
model indirect addressing. 
C.4. Use exercise C.l and the arithmeticity of address-computable functions. 
C.5. The formula (for all finite v) tl can be replaced by 
(for all u) ([u finite] +c(), 
where [V finite] can be written as follows: 
3x~vx*(o(x, +x2)=0). 
C.6. We have the equivalence: 
(the closed formula with number n is true) 
++ (there exists a function which assigns the value T or F to any closed 
formula of arithmetic, which has the properties indicated in the defini- 
tion of truth and which assigns the value T to the nth closed formula). 
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C.7. Our computable function, which gives a one-to-one correspondence between 
N2 and N, is arithmetic. We can use this function to reduce two-place functions to 
one-place functions. 
C.8. Use an argument analogous to the proof of Tarski’s theorem. The second part 
of the problem is similar to Exercise C.6. 
C.9. Let all address programs be represented (coded) by natural numbers. Prove 
that, with a natural choice of such a coding, the function F from N4 to N which is 
given by setting F(n,x,y, k)=(the number in the yth register after the kth step of the 
address program with code n when applied to input X) is address-computable. (This 
function is obviously computable.) 
C.10. See the hint for Exercise C.9. 
D.1. This calculus is decidable. Here is an algorithm which decides it. Suppose we 
are given words P and Q. In order to determine whether or not they are equivalent, 
replace all groups of repeating a’s by a single a, and all groups of repeating b’s by 
a single b. (For example, the word aaububbuu is transformed to ububu.) If the same 
word results for Q as for P, then they are equivalent; otherwise, they are not 
equivalent. 
D.2. Suppose that the calculus has the form 
an’ c-f urn’ 
an2 tf .m2 
with mi # ni for all i; let hi denote 1 mi - ni 1; and let p be the smallest number among all 
the mi and Iii. Then no word of length less than p is equivalent to another word (since 
none of the substitutions can be applied to such a word), and the words of length 
m and n (where m, n 2 p) are equivalent to one another if and only if m-n is divisible 
by gcd (h, , . . , h). 
D.3. The word bubuu is transformed to buubu (the algorithm produces a result); the 
word ubuub is processed to the word bbubab, and then the algorithm cannot be 
applied (the algorithm stops without producing a result); the word baabu is trans- 
formed as follows: 
baubu-+ubaaba+baubub+ababubu+bababab-+bububabu-+.. 
This process continues on indefinitely without stopping because the word bu . ha 
(with ha repeated n times) is transformed to the word aba . . abu (n times), which is 
then transformed to ba . . . ba (2n times). 
D.4. Every word in this calculus is equivalent to one of the words a, UC, ucc, uccc, 
the empty word, c, cc, or ccc (we shall call these eight words reduced words). We can 
use the substitution b H act to remove all b’s, then use the substitution ca tf accc to 
move all u’s to the left of all c’s. We can now use the substitution of the empty word for 
au or cccc to ensure that there are at most 1 occurrence of a and at most three 
occurrences of c. 
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We now prove that none of the reduced words are equivalent to one another. We do 
this by letting every word correspond to a certain transformation of the square (i.e., 
a certain permutation of the vertices of the square). Namely, we let the word 
c correspond to a 90” rotation, we let the word a correspond to reflection about the 
center line parallel to one of the sides, and we let the word b correspond to reflection 
about the center line parallel to the other pair of sides. We let a word obtained by 
joining two words P and Q correspond to the composition of the two transformations 
of the square corresponding to P and Q (in that order). It is not hard to verify that 
equivalent words correspond to the same transformation, and that the reduced words 
all correspond to different transformations. Hence, the reduced words are all in- 
equivalent to each other. 
The following algorithm decides this calculus. To determine whether or not two 
words P and Q are equivalent, first replace each by an equivalent reduced word, and 
then compare the two reduced words. If they are the same, then P and Q are 
equivalent; if not, then P and Q are inequivalent. 
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